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This thesis analyses the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan according to 
principles of international law. First, the British imperial background to the dispute is 
described; then, in four chapters, various aspects of the dispute are discussed. Chapter 
One focusses on the means by which Kashmir joined the Indian union and evaluates 
several legal objections to the accession of Kashmir to India. Chapter Two looks at 
the use of force by India, Pakistan, and others in Kashmir, whether force was used 
legally, and the legal consequences of the territorial situations resulting from the 
fighting. Chapter Three examines the efforts of the United Nations to resolve the 
dispute; it also discusses Indo-Pakistani bilateral diplomacy. Finally, Chapter Four 
addresses the question of self-determination in Kashmir, considering the claims of 
India and Pakistan as well as the notion that Kashmir may be legally entitled to 
independence. The conclusion of the thesis is that India and Pakistan both have valid 
claims to portions of Kashmir but that neither may claim it in its entirety; that 
Kashmir is not entitled to independence; and that the results of a UN-supervised 
plebiscite should be used to demarcate a permanent Indo-Pakistani boundary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the past fifty-five years, India and Pakistan have been locked in a seemingly 
intractable territorial dispute over Kashmir.1 At this writing, the well-entrenched armies 
of both countries face each other along a five hundred mile-long line that weaves its way 
through the foothills of the Himalayas. Known as the Line of Control (LOC), it is the de 
facto border between India and Pakistan. The LOC has been forged by three wars 
between the two countries, which took place in 1947-8,1965 and 1971. Although no ful l -
scale armed conflict has taken place there in over thirty years, artillery and small-arms 
skirmishing is common, and tensions frequently bring India and Pakistan to the brink of 
war; this occurred most recently in May 2002 and December 2001. Pakistan's successful 
test of an atomic bomb in 1998 parried India's nuclear capability, and now the spectre of 
nuclear war looms over the ongoing territorial dispute. 
The dispute finds its origins in the structure of the British Indian Empire, a vast 
conglomeration of lands comprising modern-day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. From 
the late eighteenth century until the middle of the twentieth, the British Crown ruled the 
Indian subcontinent. By the end of World War I I , however, it became clear that Britain 
lacked the financial and military potential to maintain its enormous empire, and that it 
would have to relinquish power in India as well as in most of its other colonies. Although 
the Indian subcontinent had been united under the aegis of the Crown, negotiations 
1 A note on terminology is appropriate at the very beginning. I use the term "Kashmir" to mean the entire 
area disputed by India and Pakistan, not just the Vale of Kashmir, which is a small fraction of that territory. 
I also use "Kashmir" interchangeably with the "State of Jammu and Kashmir," which is a common 
shorthand device employed in the literature. When referring specifically to the Vale of Kashmir, I always 
use the term "Vale of Kashmir." 
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between the British and Hindu and Muslim leaders revealed that such a union would not 
be practical in the new India. Therefore, Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Viceroy, crafted a 
plan to partition the British Indian Empire along religious lines, creating two new nations. 
India and Pakistan.2 The latter, led by Mohammed Al i Jinnah, would be an Islamic state; 
the former, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, would be a secular state, home to more Muslims 
than Pakistan. Mountbatten had formulated this plan by 3 June 1947; according to its 
terms, British India would achieve independence on 15 August of that same year.3 
The task of delimiting the new Indo-Pakistani boundary fell to a boundary 
commission chaired by eminent jurist Sir Cyril Radcliffe. Sir Cyril's main "qualification" 
for the job was that he had never set foot on the subcontinent and so would not be biased 
in his deliberations. Nor did he linger unnecessarily—he boarded a ship for England on 
15 August. During his brief stay in India, Sir Cyril oversaw the creation of the new Indo-
Pakistani border. However, the division of Britain's subcontinental empire would be 
considerably more complicated. There were two types of administrative units within the 
empire: provinces of British India and princely states. The latter were semiautonomous 
fiefdoms, whose rulers had signed treaties with Britain recognising the paramountcy of 
the Crown, whereas the former had been conquered outright. Some princely states were 
huge; others just a few acres. Altogether, the 562 princely states represented 45 percent of 
the empire's land area. Under the Mountbatten Plan, the Radcliffe Commission would 
partition only the provinces. The princely states were to be kept intact, granted 
independence and given the option of joining India or Pakistan.4 
2 Bangladesh was part of Pakistan until 1971; formerly it was known as East Pakistan. 
3 The Indian Independence Act 1947 implemented the Mountbatten Plan. 
4 In reality, only states bordering both India and Pakistan (like Kashmir) would have a choice between the 
two. 
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The Kashmir dispute of today is the unresolved struggle between India and 
Pakistan for the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, which lay at the northern end of 
the India-Pakistan frontier. The Radcliffe Commission had delimited a boundary running 
through the British India province of Punjab, forming the southern two-thirds of the new, 
international boundary. Delimitation of the northern end of the boundary, by virtue of the 
Mountbatten Plan, depended on the decision of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir: 
Would he choose India or Pakistan? 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had been founded in 1846, when the British 
East India Company concluded the Treaty of Amristar with Maharaja Gulab Singh of 
Jammu. Under the terms of the treaty, the Hindu Maharaja and his heirs would rule over a 
newly constituted state comprising the Maharaja's homeland of Jammu as well as tens of 
thousands of square miles of additional territory, including the Vale of Kashmir, 
Baltistan, Ladakh and Gilgit, making it the largest of the princely states. In return for 
this, the Maharaja accepted the supremacy of the British Crown, an action that he 
reaffirmed on an annual basis by rendering to British authorities a tribute of one horse, 
twelve goats and six pashmina shawls. That relationship continued until 15 August 1947, 
when British rule came to an end. 
In 1941, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had a population of approximately four 
million. Half of those people lived in Jammu, and 1.7 million in the Vale of Kashmir, 
with the remainder scattered across the more sparsely populated northern and eastern 
regions of the state, such as Baltistan and Ladakh. The state was 77 percent Muslim and 
20 percent Hindu; Sikhs and Buddhists were tiny minorities.5 The Maharaja ruled over 
one of the world's most picturesque landscapes, and the mild, upland climate provided a 
5 Almost all of the state's Hindu residents lived in Jammu. 
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welcome break from the searing plains to the south. Hindus and Muslims alike 
considered the Vale of Kashmir to be a sort of earthly paradise. Moreover, the state was 
strategically located on the rooftop of the subcontinent. Gulab Singh's ability to control 
this vital area had won him recognition from the British; now India and Pakistan would 
vie for the right to be the Maharaja's overlord. 
The chapters that follow will offer a legal analysis of the claims of India and 
Pakistan to Kashmir. Chapter One examines the controversy surrounding the accession of 
the Maharaja to India in October 1947. It lays out the legal status of the princely states 
before, during and after independence and establishes that Jammu and Kashmir did 
indeed become an independent state upon the departure of the British. Next, the legal 
significance of the geographic, economic and cultural links between Pakistan and 
Kashmir are evaluated, including an agreement between the Maharaja and the new 
government of Pakistan to preserve the economic arrangements that had existed between 
Kashmir and the part of British India that became Pakistan. Then, I move on to a 
consideration of the legality of the accession itself to consider whether the accession was 
obtained by fraud or coercion, and whether the Maharaja had the legal capacity to accede 
to India despite a widespread rebellion against his rule. I also look briefly at the 
accessions of two other very large princely states—Hyderabad and Junagadh—to offer 
some comparisons with the accession of Kashmir. 
Chapter Two evaluates the use of force by India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Shortly 
before 15 August 1947, violence erupted in Kashmir as various groups in the state tried to 
anticipate and shape the post-independence order. That violence included a Muslim 
rebellion against the Maharaja as well as repression of Muslim civilians by Hindu troops 
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loyal to the Maharaja. With possession of Kashmir hanging in the balance, both India and 
Pakistan became involved in the fighting. Accordingly, this chapter looks at the law of 
the use of force, especially as it relates to intervention in a civil war, the supply of 
weapons to parties in a civil war, and the use of irregular forces or armed bands. In this 
chapter I also examine the legal status of the far western and northwestern areas of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been occupied by rebel forces before the 
Maharaja's accession, to determine whether Pakistan's current occupation of those areas 
is legal. 
Chapter Three reviews the course that the Kashmir dispute followed through the 
United Nations (UN), as well as some of the relevant bilateral diplomacy between 
Islamabad and Delhi. The UN began to consider the dispute in 1948, upon India's 
complaint to the Security Council that Pakistan was guilty of aggression in Kashmir. 
First, I consider the role that the UN plays in international law and then discuss the 
resolutions that the UN generated with respect to Kashmir, including the extent to which 
those resolutions are legally binding on India and Pakistan. I also address the possibility 
that circumstances have changed since the passage of those resolutions, rendering them 
legally unenforceable. This chapter also looks at the reports of various UN officials who 
toured Kashmir—their observations help to clarify the legal positions of India and 
Pakistan in the post-independence period. Finally, I evaluate the legal significance of the 
bilateral treaties ending the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, especially India's 
contention that the 1972 Simla Agreement supplants UN resolutions. 
Chapter Four discusses the issue of self-determination as it relates to Kashmir. It 
traces the evolution of self-determination from a moral principle to an international legal 
vii 
norm by looking at UN resolutions, international tribunal decisions and state practice. In 
spite of that development, self-determination is still a rather elusive concept, and some 
discussion of its application was necessary in order to clarify the meaning of the term. 
This chapter also addresses some of the practical implications of self-determination for 
Kashmir, for example, whether the Kashmiris are entitled to self-determination; the 
circumstances under which international law permits secession; and how self-
determination can be reconciled with the principle of territorial integrity. 
In the conclusion, I reflect on the more salient principles of international law in 
the Kashmir dispute and offer a critical summary of the arguments of India and Pakistan, 
addressing what I consider to be the most important points in the dispute. 
Finally, a geographical note: Three states now possess portions of the territory 
formerly ruled by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir—India, Pakistan and China. The 
northern boundaries of the princely state were very poorly defined, due to the desolate 
nature of inter-Himalayan terrain. In the 1950s China made claims to territory south of 
the northernmost border shown on British maps. China occupied that territory after a 
1962 war with India and a 1963 treaty of cession with Pakistan. However, India still 
disputes its border with China. At any rate, China is a party to "the other Kashmir 
dispute." 
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CHAPTER ONE: ACCESSION 
The events surrounding the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India 
mark the beginning of the Kashmir dispute. As such, the accession controversy is an 
appropriate starting point for a critical evaluation of the claims of India and Pakistan 
to Kashmir. India bases its claim on the accession of the Maharaja of Jammu and 
Kashmir to India on 26 October 1947, and Pakistan refutes the legality of that 
accession on a number of grounds. The issue of accession is therefore crucial to both 
India and Pakistan's positions, and it requires substantial examination. To that end, a 
short review of the events leading up to accession will be offered, along with the 
identification of certain salient legal issues. An evaluation of those issues will follow, 
at which point some conclusions about the legality of accession should be possible. 
The accession controversy arose from Britain's plan for the partition of its 
Indian empire, whose land area was divided roughly half-and-half between British 
India proper and the princely states. The British plan for the independence of the 
Indian subcontinent created the two new dominions of India and Pakistan. On 
Independence Day, 15 August 1947, those dominions succeeded to the territory 
known as British India. The boundary between them was delimited along religious 
lines.1 The princely states became completely independent in theory, although this 
situation was neither feasible nor desirable for the vast majority of states, surrounded 
as they were by either India or Pakistan and generally too small to fend for themselves 
in the international arena. Some princely states were tiny and had very little autonomy 
under British rule; all princely states, however, relied to some extent on services from 
'Alistair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 104. 
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British India. Accordingly, the partition plan allowed for the states to sign instruments 
of accession to the dominion of their choice.2 
For several reasons, it seemed as though Kashmir might be able to make a bid 
for independence. First, Kashmir was a very large princely state. At 84,000 square 
miles, it was bigger than England, and almost the size of the United Kingdom.3 
Second, Kashmir shared a border with both India and Pakistan. As neither dominion 
surrounded Kashmir, neither could present itself as the obvious choice. Kashmir also 
bordered China and Afghanistan, and nearly the Soviet Union. Such great geopolitical 
importance, while perhaps a curse,4 ostensibly suggested that Kashmir had the 
geographical potential to be independent. Finally, Kashmir had a Hindu monarchy 
and a predominantly Muslim population. With its own communal divisions, it would 
not unanimously plump for one dominion over another. 
Thus the Maharaja chose not so sign an instrument of accession initially. It 
appears that he wished for his nation to become a "Switzerland of the East," an 
independent, mountainous country immune from the destructive rivalries of its more 
powerful neighbours.5 In an effort to maintain his precarious independence, he 
proposed "standstill agreements" with both of the new dominions. The Indian 
Independence Act 1947 provides that princely states could conclude standstill 
agreements with either or both dominions to maintain the administrative status quo 
and avoid chaos as the British departed.6 As their name suggests, standstill 
agreements would continue the relationship that had existed between a princely state 
2 Sheikh Abdullah, 'India, Pakistan and Kashmir." Foreign Affairs (1965) 528. 
3 Ramatullah Khan, Kashmir and the United Nations, 27. 
4 One of Lamb's observations is that Kashmir's position in the geopolitical cockpit of South Asia 
meant that strategic considerations, especially those of India, would stand as a barrier to Kashmiri 
independence. 
5 H O. Agarwal, The Kashmir Problem: Its Legal Aspects, 31. Ulster or Bosnia would be closer 
European analogies. 
6 Indian Independence Act 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. VI), Section 7. 
and British India during the transition from British rule to dominion government. 
Kashmir had relied on British India for infrastructure (road and rail links to the 
outside world, telegraph lines and post routes), trade and defence.7 The Maharaja 
proposed the standstill agreements in order to maintain those essential services, as 
well as to buy time to solidify Kashmir's independence. 
Pakistan accepted the standstill agreement. India declined, stating that 
Kashmir should send representatives to Delhi to negotiate one. Meanwhile, Kashmiri 
Muslims, especially in the Poonch region, began to agitate for accession to Pakistan. 
That agitation turned to full-scale rebellion against the Maharaja, attracting 
sympathetic Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan. Kashmiri government forces were 
inadequate to meet the threat, and the Maharaja was forced to flee Srinagar ahead of 
rebel forces. With the State of Jammu and Kaslirnir teetering on the point of collapse, 
the Maharaja approached India and requested military assistance. India agreed to 
provide that assistance only i f the Maharaja would sign an instrument of accession to 
India. The Maharaja signed the document, and Indian forces were rushed into 
Kashmir to deal with the rebels. Indian troops were able to push the rebels back, but 
eventually a line stabilised, running north-south about eighteen miles from the 
Pakistani border, then curving east such that extreme western and northwestern areas 
of Kashmir were under the control of the rebels. Areas west of the line became known 
as Azad (Free) Kashmir; those to the north of the line are known as the Northern 
Areas. The remainder fell within India.8 
A number of issues emerge regarding the legal status of Kashmir on the eve of 
independence. First, did the State of Jammu and Kashmir ever gain full 
7 Sheikh Abdullah, 528. 
8 Lamb, 342. 
independence? Did it really become a sovereign state, or was it just the personal 
demesne of an over-mighty nobleman who became a paper head-of-state? Second, i f 
Kashmir was bound to join one dominion or another, did it naturally belong to 
Pakistan? How about the standstill agreement? Did the Maharaja's agreement with 
Pakistan to maintain the status quo debar Kashmir from negotiating with India on the 
issue of accession? Did it amount to an instrument of accession to Pakistan? There is 
also the issue of the alleged attempt by Pakistan to coerce Kashmir's accession by 
blockading Kashmir. Did this happen, and i f so, was it a violation of the standstill 
agreement? 
The competence of the Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession has also 
come into question. With the Maharaja running for his life from his own capital, was 
he really in a position to sign the country over to India? As to the instrument of 
accession itself: Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of India, stated that the final 
disposition of Kashmir should be decided by "reference to the will of the people" after 
order had been restored in Kashmir. Does that make the accession conditional, or was 
it, as India claims, final and irrevocable? Finally, even i f the instrument of accession 
was valid and final, was it coerced or obtained fraudulently? An evaluation of those 
questions will reveal the legal strength of the Indian and Pakistani arguments as the 
Kashmir dispute began. 
A. Was Kashmir an Independent, Sovereign State as of 15 August 1947? 
The Government of Jammu and Kashmir executed two agreements that are relevant to 
the issue of accession: the standstill agreement with Pakistan and the instrument of 
accession to India. For any discussion of those and related issues to proceed, the 
international standing of the government of Kashmir as of 15 August 1947, when the 
paramountcy of the British crown lapsed, must first be established. 
4 
Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States sets out 
four criteria that an independent, sovereign state must meet.9 A state must have a 
population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states. Kashmir had a population, and its territorial limits were defined in 
the 1846 Treaty of Amristar. A population need not be all the same race or creed; thus 
in spite of Kashmir's Hindu-Muslim divisions, all people within the boundaries of 
Kashmir were considered to be the people of Kashmir.10 Regarding the government of 
Kashmir: The rule of the Maharaja had been recognised by the Treaty of Amristar and 
confirmed by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act 1939, which provided that 
"all powers, legislative, executive and judicial in relation to the State and its 
Government [belong to] His Highness [the Maharaja]."11 It is true that the powers of 
the Maharaja were somewhat circumscribed under British paramountcy—the Crown 
assumed responsibility for communications and defence, and it reserved the right to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the state. However, the Maharaja controlled the 
apparatus of government, governing Kashmir through a council. At any rate, when 
paramountcy lapsed, the Crown's powers reverted to the Maharaja in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act. 1 2 
A state must also have the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
There is some debate among writers as to whether de facto or de jure capacity is 
required. Some authorities have indicated that the state must not only have the 
capacity in law to enter into relations with other states—it must also have the 
9 Signed 26 December 1933. Quoted in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 70. 
Brownlie indicates that while the four criteria must be met, they are no more than a basis for further 
investigation. 
1 0 L.F.L. Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim's International Law, vol. 1, 118. 
1 1 Jammu & Kashmir Constitution Act of 1939. 
1 2 Agarwal, 27. 
political, technical and financial capabilities to do so.13 Such requirements allude to 
the problem of recognition, and they also suggest a normative approach to 
determining capacity for foreign relations. The more prevalent view, however, is the 
positive one: that the state has the capacity to enter into foreign relations when it is 
subject to the sovereignty of no other state.14 Therefore, the state's capacity in law is 
the issue, not whether it can afford to buy embassies all over the world or retain a 
large coterie of ambassadors.15 It is even possible for a state to transfer control of its 
foreign relations to another state without surrendering its own sovereignty. For 
example in the 1955 Nottebohm case, Liechtenstein was admitted as a party before the 
ICJ despite having transferred control of its foreign relations to Switzerland.16 
According to Shaw, the essence of capacity is the independence of the state from 
other states or international organisations.17 
Upon the lapse of British paramountcy, the princely states became fully 
independent in an international sense. The Indian Independence Act Section 7 (b) and 
(c) indicates that the Crown's paramountcy over the princely states was to terminate. 
Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India, said in the weeks preceding 
independence that the princely states would be "entirely free to choose whether to 
associate with one or the other of the Dominion Governments, or to stand alone, and 
His Majesty's Government will not use the slightest pressure to influence their 
momentous and voluntary decision."18 Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, echoed those 
sentiments when he stated that the princely states would "have complete freedom— 
1 3 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States. 
1 4 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 143; Doehring, "State," EPIL, 603. 
1 5 Mountbatten mentioned these practical concerns to the princes to convince them of the wisdom of 
accession. 
1 6 Henkin et al., Cases and Materials in International Law, 249. 
1 7 Shaw, 143. 
1 8 Lord Listowel, 16/7/47, quoted by Clive Eagleton in "The Case of Hyderabad before the Security 
Council." 44 AJIL (1950), 282. 
technically and legally they are independent." Thus there is a presumption that 
Kashmir did become an independent, sovereign state upon the lapse of British 
paramountcy. 
However, the notion^that Kashmir ever gained full independence has been 
attacked on a number of grounds. First, it is possible to object that Kashmir lacked the 
capacity for foreign relations because foreign relations had been the province of the 
paramount power, and the standstill agreement transferred the power to conduct 
foreign relations to Pakistan. This point will be considered in Part C below, which 
examines the standstill agreement in detail. For now it will suffice to point out that 
Kashmir did indeed become independent on 15 August pursuant to the terms of the 
Indian Independence Act; as of 15 August Kashmir was not subject to any outside 
authority. 
Another objection is that the sovereignty of the princely states existed only in 
theory and on paper. In reality, some argue, Kashmir might have been technically 
independent for short time, but it never had the potential to sustain itself as an 
independent state.20 That view, which is confirmed substantially by hindsight, helps to 
illustrate the true nature of Kashmir's status in the brief period between independence 
and accession. First, the Indian Independence Act did indeed dissolve the 
paramountcy of the Crown, as well as treaties between Britain and the princely states 
related thereto. But Section 7(c) of the Act preserves certain state functions (customs, 
transit, communications, post and telegraph) until those arrangements were either 
denounced by the princely state or new dominion, or superseded by a subsequent 
1 9 Lord Mountbatten, quoted by Paras Diwan in "Kashmir and the Indian Union: The Legal Position." 
ICLQ (1953), 339. 
2 0 Gururaj Rao, The Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem, 21-24. It is further argued by Taraknath 
Das, in "The Status of Hyderabad during and after British Rule in India," that the princely states never 
possessed any international status, whether theoretical or actual. 43 AJIL (1949) 57. 
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agreement. Full sovereignty for the princely states would have been unprecedented. 
Although some rulers may have aspired to independence, that was not something that 
they had heretofore possessed21 Princely states thus had little potential for 
independence, and Section 7(c) strongly implies that the accession of each princely 
state to one of the dominions was just a matter of time.22 
The case of the princely state of Hyderabad tends to support that proposition. 
Like Kashmir, Hyderabad was a very large princely state toying with the notion of 
full-fledged independence, but unlike Kashmir it was surrounded by India. It had a 
land area the size of Italy. The Nizam of Hyderabad, a Muslim, ruled over a 
predominantly Hindu population of sixteen million. Upon independence the Nizam 
entered into a standstill agreement with India. Under pressure from India to sign an 
instrument of accession, the Nizam offered to submit the question of accession to a 
plebiscite supervised by the United Nations. India insisted that the Nizam accede first 
and hold the plebiscite later; negotiations eventually broke down when the Indian 
Government, citing border raids by Hyderabadi Muslims against Hindus in India 
proper, sent troops to occupy Hyderabad in a so-called police action.23 The Nizam 
brought his case before the UN Security Council, which ended its deliberations on the 
matter when the Nizam withdrew his case. Occupied by Indian troops, Hyderabad 
finally acceded to India after over a year of arm-twisting 2 4 
2 1 Das, 69-70. 
2 2 Rao: "The accession of a State to either Dominion, although optional on paper became obligatory 
from a practical point of view, i. e., a state could not have refused to join either of the two Dominions" 
(21). 
2 3 Khan, 77-79. 
2 4 Eagleton, 301-302. 
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The Hyderabad episode demonstrates that India viewed as a foregone 
conclusion the accession of those princely states within its catchment area.25 India 
could find substantial justification for that view in the logic of the British partition 
plan, which suggested that the princely states were not only obligated to join one 
dominion or the other; they were further obligated to join the dominion that 
surrounded them, i f there was one. The Dominions of India and Pakistan were the 
successor states to British India, and as such they would assume the role of paramount 
power to fill the vacuum left by Britain. 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India stated that he considered the 
accession of a princely state to be complete once the state had acceded on three basic 
subjects—foreign affairs, communication and defence.26 Those three subjects, which 
had been the province of the paramount power, Britain, would be assumed by India 
(or Pakistan) in the princely states. Once a state had acceded in those key areas, full 
incorporation into the Indian Union (for example) would follow. States within India's 
catchment area could delay accession through a standstill agreement, but they could 
not avoid it. The standstill agreement could be seen as a stopgap measure to prevent a 
breakdown of order while accession arrangements were being finalised. Such a 
reading of Section 7(c) of the Indian Independence Act makes sense when one 
considers that accession was the only means for India and Pakistan to succeed to 
British paramountcy in the princely states. While the Act denied the successor 
dominions paramountcy over the princely states by granting them independence, the 
relationship between paramount power and princely state remained essential to the 
By "catchment area" I mean sphere of influence with respect to partition; in other words, princely 
states surrounded by India could be said to fall within India's catchment area. 
2 6 Nehru, quoted in Diwan at 341-342. 
Q 
survival of the princely states. It seemed clear that those states would perforce create 
similar relationship with one of the dominions.27 
Moreover, certain statements by British officials in the run-up to independence 
stress that the princely states were duty-bound to accede to one of the dominions in 
due course. For example, Sir Anthony Shawcross, the Attorney General, stated that 
the British Government would not recognise the international status of the 
governments of the princely states, as Britain hoped that the states would "associate 
themselves with one or the other of the Dominions." Lord Mountbatten, after stating 
that the states were "theoretically free" to join either dominion, went on to say that for 
all intents and purposes those states surrounded by India had no real choice.28 
Mountbatten's statement of course leaves open the question of the accession 
of Kashmir, as Kashmir was not surrounded by either dominion. His statement does, 
however, cast aspersions on the notion, expressed by Mountbatten himself among 
others, that independence would be an option for princely states such as Kashmir.29 
It is crucial to distinguish the letter of such official statements from the spirit in which 
they were made. Without a doubt, the governments of India, Pakistan and Britain 
wanted to avoid "plan Balkan," a nightmare scenario in which the five-hundred-odd 
princely states would assert their new international personalities.30 The Indian 
Independence Act, when read alongside British statements, indicates that the intention 
of the departing British was to convey paramountcy over the princely states to the 
2 7 Das, 70. 
2 8 Mountbatten: "You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any 
more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible." (Address to 
Chamber of Princes, 25/7/47). 
2 9 Mountbatten: "The Indian Independence Act released the states from all obligations to the Crown. 
The states will have complete freedom-technically and legally they become independent. But there 
was... a system of coordinated administration . . which meant that the sub-continent of India acted as 
an economic unit. That link is now to be broken. I f nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result 
and that chaos I submit will hurt the states first." (Address to Chamber of Princes, 25/7/47). 
3 0 Lamb, 102 and 102 fii. 2. "Thus the great achievement of a united India would not have outlasted the 
Raj; the temple, as it were, would be brought down along with the British." 
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successor dominions, India and Pakistan. But Britain did not convey paramountcy to 
the dominions. Instead Britain relied on the princely states themselves to render to the 
dominions those trappings of sovereignty that they gained as a result of independence. 
Not surprisingly, some of the larger princely states lagged in their enthusiasm for this 
rather convoluted method of partition, not least because the legal apparatus for British 
withdrawal, the Indian Independence Act, had granted them independence. 
Notwithstanding that independence for the princely states was destined to be 
fleeting, independence was indeed the legal result of the Indian Independence Act. 
Section 7 of the Act, which deals with the princely states, explicitly renounces all 
British rights and prerogatives with respect to the princely states. It dissolves all 
treaties between Britain and the princely states, such as the Treaty of Amristar, which 
established the paramountcy of the Crown in Kashmir. From that moment on, Britain 
had no authority over the princely states. It could advise, but not legally compel, the 
princely states to sign standstill agreements or instruments of accession. The Act 
states that existing arrangements between British India and the princely states would 
continue, but the Act itself had no force in the princely states after 15 August 1947. A 
state could not be both independent and governed by provisions of the Indian 
Independence Act. The Act served as the basic law of successor states India and 
Pakistan, but only upon its incorporation by those dominions themselves.31 Any 
powers reserved by the Crown in the imperial period reverted to the rulers of the 
princely states, in law and in fact. Thus before the Maharaja's accession to India, the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir became fully sovereign and independent. That 
3 1 India and Pakistan's dominion status meant that the King (Queen after 1952) was still the nominal 
head of state. India became a republic in 1950, Pakistan in 1956. 
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Kashmir's independence would necessarily be short-lived does not mean that it never 
existed. 
Finally, it has been argued that the failure of the international community to 
recognise the State of Jammu and Kashmir means that in spite of the foregoing, it was 
not really a sovereign state in international law.3 2 Writers differ on the place of 
recognition within international law: Is recognition by other states an essential 
characteristic of any state, or is recognition merely an acknowledgment of the state's 
existence?33 It is possible to view lack of recognition as undermining a state's 
capacity for foreign relations, one of the four Montevideo criteria for statehood. 
However, the Montevideo Convention itself stipulates that the existence of a state is 
"independent of recognition by the other States." 
On the one hand, the legal fact of independence cannot depend on the 
recognition of that fact by other states.34 Prima facie a new state granted full formal 
independence by a former sovereign has the international right to govern its 
territory.35 Neither India nor Pakistan was likely to recognise Kashmir's 
independence, as both nations were trying to acquire the former princely state for 
themselves.36 On the other, Kashmir could not, realistically speaking, conduct foreign 
relations i f no other nation would recognise it. It could not form alliances with other 
states. In any case, Kashmir's period of independence was ephemeral. From the 
moment that British paramountcy lapsed, Kashmir was an independent state in every 
3 2 Rao asserts that Kashmir had no international status because, among other reasons, it was not 
recognised internationally. 
3 3 James Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law." 48 B Y I L (1976), 99-105. These 
positions are known as the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition. In the former, statehood 
depends on international recognition; in the latter, statehood exists independent of recognition. See 
Brownlie, 87-89. 
3 4 Agarwal, 28-29, obviates the suggestion that a lack of recognition by the world community impinges 
on the fact that Kashmir became independent on 15 August 1947. 
3 5 Crawford, 117. 
3 6 Ibid. 
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legal sense. But the gap between theory and reality would widen as Kashmir struggled 
to stand on its own. 
B. The Legal Significance of Kashmir's Contiguity to Pakistan 
Kashmir's independence was precarious indeed. As autumn 1947 approached, the 
state was beset by internal violence and external pressures. This instability was related 
to partition generally, and the question of Kashmir's (inevitable) accession to one of 
the dominions in particular. 
Of the 561 other princely states, only Hyderabad had declined to accede to 
India or Pakistan. The British plan for Indian independence envisaged that all princely 
states would eventually find their natural home in one dominion or the other.37 The 
accession of each princely state to the appropriate dominion would complete the 
partition work that the Radcliffe Commission had started. Conventional wisdom held 
that the princely states would have to accede to one of the dominions eventually . 3 8 
With reference to Kashmir, Pakistan argued that the theory that underlay partition 
should also guide accession: Muslim areas that were geographically contiguous to the 
Muslim core area in the West Punjab should go to Pakistan. Therefore, Kashmir 
belonged in Pakistan because Kashmir fell within Pakistan's catchment area.39 That 
argument lies at the bottom of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir and find its basis in the 
close connections between Kashmir and Pakistan. 
Kashmir is a predominantly Muslim area40 It is geographically contiguous to 
Pakistan.41 The main rivers that run through Pakistan (which converge to form the 
Lord Listowel hoped that "in the fullness of tune all the [princely] States should find their 
appropriate place within on or the other of the new Dominions." Quoted by Eagleton at 283. 
3* Rao, 21. 
3 9 Rudolf Geiger, "Kashmir." EPIL, 71. Pakistan made this argument before the U N Security Council. 
4 0 Please note the discussion of the religious composition of Jammu and Kashmir in the introduction 
above. 
River Indus) rise in Kashmir, and India is separated from Kashmir by mountains. On 
topographical maps of South Asia, Kashmir appears to be an extension of Pakistan.42 
During the all-important summer of 1947, the following conditions obtained in 
Kashmir: The only road to the outside world ran through the Jhelum Valley and into 
Pakistan; the only rail line into Kashmir came up from Sialkot in Pakistan; postal and 
telegraphic services operated along routes that led into Pakistan. Almost all Kashmiri 
trade went through Pakistan. 
The infrastructure established during British rule, which linked the landlocked 
princely state to the rest of the world, connected Kashmir to Pakistan. Alistair Lamb 
documents the way in which British imperial policy makers viewed Kashmir as an 
integral part of the strategically important northwest frontier of British India. Lamb 
goes on to declare that in light of the cultural and geographical ties between Pakistan 
and Kashmir, there is little doubt that the Radcliffe Commission would have awarded 
most of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan had the area been part of British 
India proper and not a princely state.43 
Doctrines of geographical contiguity do not, however, occupy a place of 
honour in the canons of international law. Judge Huber in the Isle of Palmas case 
declared that contiguity "as a basis of territorial sovereignty, has no foundation in 
international law."4 4 Contiguity was also brushed aside in the Beagle Channel 
arbitration, in which Argentina advanced the "oceanic" principle in its boundary 
4 1 The word 'Takistan" is an acronym P for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir; -istan alludes 
to Baluchistan and is also a common ending for an Asian country. 
4 2 Pitman Potter, "The Principal Legal and Political Problems Involved in the Kashmir Dispute." 44 
AJIL(1950) 362-363. 
4 3 Lamb, 12. 
4 4 2 RIAA 829. 
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dispute with Chile. There, the tribunal held that treaties and former administrative 
boundaries were more salient than Argentina's appeal to contiguity. According to 
Santiago Torres Bernardez, the notion of contiguity has historically been abused to 
circumvent the normal requirements for effective possession.46 In some cases— 
Eastern Greenland for example—the contiguity argument has been accepted, but only 
because of the remote and inhospitable nature of the territory in question, and the 
absence of competing claims thereto. Ian Brownlie writes that contiguity is merely a 
technique in the application of normal principles of effective occupation. Contiguity is 
a "logical and equitable" principle, which is not by itself a root of title. It is used in 
determining the actual extent of sovereignty derived from some orthodox source of 
title such as a treaty of cession or effective occupation.47 
Under a simpler imperial system Kashmir might have fallen within the same 
administrative unit as the area that became Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan's contiguity 
argument would be bolstered to the point of being dispositive i f it could have applied 
the doctrine of uti possidetis to support its contention that Kashmir should have gone 
to Pakistan.48 However, as has been established in the foregoing paragraphs, Kashmir 
was not only a princely state (and therefore not part of West Punjab province), but it 
also became an independent and sovereign state with the coming into force of the 
Indian Independence Act. Legally at least, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was the 
master of its own fate. Although the British partition plan had never seriously 
contemplated Kashmiri independence, Pakistan could not instantly present a valid 
legal claim to Kashmir. The administrative, geographical and cultural ties between 
4 5 Beagle Channel Award, 17 I L M (1978), 634. The "oceanic" or "Atlantic" principle asserted that the 
natural domains of Chile and Argentina, south of the Andes Cordillera, were the lands adjacent to the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, respectively. 
4 6 Santiago Torres Bemardez, "Territory, Acquisitioa"£MZ,, 837. 
4 7 Brownlie, 147. 
4 8 Lamb, 103. 
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Pakistan and Kashmir would have to be solidified by accession, or at least continued 
through a standstill agreement. 
C. The Standstill Agreement 
In a telegram of 12 August 1947, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir requested a 
standstill agreement with Pakistan; Pakistan agreed to that request on 15 August. No 
standstill agreement was ever reached with India, as it was India's policy not to 
conclude standstill agreements with a princely state until the state had signed an 
instrument of accession 4 9 The standstill agreement with Pakistan represents 
Kashmir's first act as a sovereign state, and as such the agreement could rebut the 
suggestion that Kashmir lacked the capacity to conduct foreign relations.50 The 
standstill agreement is a treaty under the rules of international law, in that it is an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law.51 The primary purpose of the standstill agreement was to preserve 
the administrative connexions that Kashmir depended on. 
The wording of the standstill agreement is economical, but some important 
legal issues arise from it. The first item to consider is the text of the agreement. It 
says: "Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Standstill Agreements with 
Pakistan on all matters on which these exist at present moment with outgoing British 
India Government. It is suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending 
settlement of details and formal execution of fresh arrangements."52 An affirmative 
reply from Pakistan's foreign ministry concluded the agreement. The agreement, 
however, fails to enumerate the "existing arrangements." To discover what those 
4 9 Agarwal, 21. This policy was altered in the case of Hyderabad, where a standstill agreement with the 
Nizam preceded the Nizam's accession to India. 
5 0 Or, it could support that presumption by showing that Kashmir had to rely on Pakistan from day one 
5 1 Definition from Vienna Convention, Article 2. 
5 2 Kashmir-Pakistan Standstill Agreement, 12 August 1947 (completed 15 August 1947). 
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arrangements were, one must look at the Indian Independence Act. Section 7(c) 
states that standstill agreements will cover "customs, transit and communications, 
posts and telegraphs, or other like matters" until the establishment of a more 
permanent relationship.54 Although that section alludes to the technical independence 
of the princely states, it suggests that they relied a great deal on British India; Section 
7(c) therefore provides a mechanism for the continuation of that vital relationship. It 
was especially important for Kashmir to negotiate a standstill agreement with 
Pakistan—Kashmir's communication and transport infrastructure linked Kashmir to 
the outside world via Pakistan.55 The military and strategic connections that Lamb 
documents further explain the need for a speedy standstill agreement between 
Kashmir and Pakistan, which is perhaps why Kashmir proposed the agreement three 
days before independence. 
Some advocates of Pakistan's claim have suggested that the standstill 
agreement debarred Kashmir from entering into the negotiations with India that 
resulted in accession.56 There are two possible bases for this argument. The first is 
that the standstill agreement preserves existing arrangements pending the execution of 
fresh agreements. Therefore, the links between Kashmir and Pakistan would be 
maintained while Kashmir and Pakistan negotiated an accession agreement, not while 
Kashmir and India negotiated one. The second is that Kashmir, by concluding the 
standstill agreement with Pakistan, relinquished its ability to conduct its foreign 
relations.57 Foreign relations had been the responsibility of the paramount power; 
Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Ixtw Perspective, 85, fh. 85 
5 4 Indian Independence Act, Section 7(c). 
5 5 This will become important in the discussion of the alleged Pakistani blockade of Kashmir. 
5 6 Hussain, (70) raises this issue but appears to belittle it somewhat; Geiger also mentions this at 69. 
3 7 Khan, 84. 
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therefore, the standstill agreement meant that Kashmir would have to conduct its 
foreign policy through Pakistan, thereby precluding the Maharaja's accession to India. 
In evaluating those arguments, it should be noted that the standstill agreement 
does not mention foreign affairs by name. It may be deduced from a reading of 
Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act that the conduct of foreign affairs falls 
under the umbrella of "existing arrangements," but nowhere in the agreement is there 
any indication that Kashmir wished to hand treaty-making power over to Pakistan. 
Indeed, the agreement implies that at a later date another treaty might be negotiated 
between Kashmir and Pakistan. 
As to the suggestion that the standstill agreement committed Kashmir to 
acceding to Pakistan: The standstill agreement was a mechanism for the continuance 
of exiting relationships in order to prevent a breakdown of order during the transfer of 
power. Princely states were legally free to accede to one dominion or the other. The 
agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan maintained the links between Kashmir and 
Pakistan for the time being; it allowed for business as usual to continue despite the 
elevation of Kashmir's status in international law from princely to sovereign state. 
Kashmir did not accede to Pakistan, nor did Kashmir by means of the standstill 
agreement surrender its right to conduct its own foreign affairs. 
Standstill agreements were typically a precursor to accession, Kashmir 
appeared to fall within Pakistan's catchment area, and the Kashmir-Pakistan standstill 
agreement alludes to impending accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. Yet that accession 
never took place. Nor did Pakistan gain any rights with respect to the territory or 
sovereignty of Kashmir as a result of the standstill agreement. It was possible for a 
princely state to have standstill agreements with both dominions simultaneously, 
something that the Maharaja attempted. Finally, the standstill agreement could not 
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affect India's right to conclude the treaty of accession with Kashmir, as third states 
cannot be affected by the terms of a treaty that they did not sign.58 Thus the standstill 
agreement did not create a legal barrier to Kashmir's accession to India. 
It is also appropriate to consider the allegation that Pakistan had violated the 
standstill agreement by blockading Kashmir in September/October 1947. As the 
Maharaja's fragile independence continued, vital goods such as petrol, oils, grain, salt 
and cloth became scarce in Kashmir. Those goods, of course, had to be brought in by 
road or rail from Pakistan. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir accused Pakistan 
of violating the standstill agreement by blockading Kashmir.59 Pakistan, for its part, 
claimed that instability along the Kashmir-Pakistan border, especially in the Poonch 
region, made lorry drivers reluctant to ply their normal routes; that refugees were 
blocking the roads; and that a coal shortage had affected the Sialkot-Jammu railway.60 
It is difficult, from the record that exists, to determine the veracity of the 
charge that Pakistan blockaded Kashmir in order to coerce Kashmir's accession. I f 
indeed it had been Pakistan's policy to withhold trade from Kashmir, such a policy 
would have violated the standstill agreement. However, the behaviour of India with 
respect to the accession of Hyderabad (and the India-Hyderabad standstill agreement 
for that matter) indicates that states wishing to remain independent were in a 
strategically untenable position.61 Kashmir, linked to the outside world through 
Pakistan, relied on trade with Pakistan for its existence just as Pakistan relied on 
Kashmir's rivers for water. 
5 8 Hans Ballreich, 'Treaties, Effect on Third States." EPIL, 945. 
5 9 Agarwal, 31-32. 
6 0 Lamb, 126. 
6 1 Eagleton, 283-284. India made an exception to its normal policy in this case, concluding a standstill 
agreement with Hyderabad even though Hyderabad had not signed an instrument of accession. 
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The logic of partition, i f applied to Kashmir, would almost certainly have 
included Kashmir with Pakistan. Yet by the terms of decolonisation, Kashmir was 
granted its independence with the unwritten proviso that it would have to accede one 
of the dominions eventually. Although Kashmir was fully independent, the case of 
Hyderabad shows that even a concerted effort by a large princely state to remain 
independent would probably have failed. Kashmir's unique geographical position 
simply allowed it to choose between India and Pakistan, not between independence 
and accession. 
D. The Validity of the Instrument ofAccession 
By late October 1947, it was clear that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir was 
breaking down. No longer able to stem communal violence within the state, the 
Maharaja's government was faced with the prospect of invasion from Pakistan. Pro-
Pakistani rebels routed government troops in Poonch and surrounding provinces. In 
the northern areas, controlled by the Gilgit Scouts, sentiment favoured accession to 
Pakistan. Patiala State forces from India had arrived on the scene to help solidify 
Kashmiri positions around Srinagar Airport. On 22 October Kashmiri Muslim troops 
mutinied and pushed their former comrades back to Srinagar. On 25 October, the 
rebels advanced on Srinagar, and cut the city's power supply. The Maharaja fled the 
darkened capital in an old Jeep for the safety of Jammu. The next day, 26 October, the 
Maharaja requested military assistance from India. India accepted on the condition 
that the Maharaja accede to India. Accordingly, the Maharaja signed the instrument of 
accession and India deployed regular troops into Kashmir on 27 October. 
Pakistan has presented several legal objections to the Maharaja's accession. 
First, Pakistan claims that the accession itself is not valid because the Kashmiri people 
had successfully rebelled against the Maharaja, who no longer controlled his own 
country and therefore could not sign treaties on its behalf. Pakistan also alleges that 
the Indian military coerced Kashmir's accession to India; in the absence of such 
coercion, Kashmir might have been able to come to an arrangement with Pakistan, 
with whom it had a standstill agreement. Additionally, Lord Mountbatten, Governor-
General of India, stated that the question of Kashmir's accession to India would be 
decided by a plebiscite, to be held once peace and order had been restored. That 
statement raises the issues of whether India was legally required to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir, and therefore, whether the Maharaja's accession was final and irrevocable. 
First, it is necessary to examine whether the Maharaja possessed the legal 
capacity to accede to India in the circumstances that prevailed in Kashmir in late 
October 1947. Under normal conditions, there would be no question that the Maharaja 
had the capacity to accede to India. As head of the independent Kashmiri state, the 
Maharaja had ultimate responsibility for foreign affairs. His assent was not only 
sufficient to conclude an instrument of accession; it was also necessary. What must be 
determined is whether the accession of the state was valid under international law 
despite the existence of an armed insurrection within the state. The issue here is 
whether the Government of Jammu and Kashmir controlled the country to such an 
extent that it still had a legal personality. Advocates of the Pakistani claim assert that 
the rebellion had progressed to the point where the Maharaja's government was no 
longer really in power and therefore lacked the legal ability to accede to India. 
Certain criteria have been established to determine whether a government 
exists in international law. These criteria resemble those used when determining 
whether to grant recognition, in that they seek to assess the government's legitimacy 
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and potential for stability. First, the government must be in actual control of the 
population and territory that it claims, or at least a substantial portion thereof. It must 
also have a reasonable chance of remaining in power. Finally, its authority must be 
separate from that of other governments and subordinate only to international law. As 
James Crawford points out, however, the application of those criteria is much less 
simple than it might seem.63 Accordingly, it will be necessary to look at a few cases in 
which the legal existence of a government was evaluated. 
In the Aaland Islands case, a tribunal was charged with determining the legal 
status of the government of the Republic of Finland in 1917 . In 1807 Finland was 
incorporated within the Russian Empire as an autonomous region. It declared 
independence after the Revolution of 1917. However, the new government 
immediately faced an insurrection by pro-Russian revolutionaries and was not able to 
establish order readily. Civil war broke out, which eventually involved both Russian 
and German troops as the Eastern Front spilled over into Finland. Revolutionary 
forces dispersed the legislature, chased the government from Helsinki, and otherwise 
forcibly prevented the government from carrying out its duties. Order was finally 
restored with the end of World War I , and the removal of Russian troops by Sweden. 
According to the tribunal, the Finnish Republic possessed a legal personality only 
after it was able to assert its authority throughout Finland without the assistance of 
foreign troops. 
Although recognition generally accompanies effective, stable control of 
territory, it is the extent of that control that determines whether a government is 
sovereign. In the Tinoco arbitration, W. H. Taft, the arbitrator, examined the status of 
6 2 Hussain, 76. Shaw, 304. 
6 3 Crawford, 102. 
the Tinoco government in Costa Rica. That government, although unrecognised by 
many nations, enjoyed popular support within Costa Rica. Citing the nature of the 
Tinoco government, Taft indicated that the absence of armed resistance to the 
government and its thorough control of the territory rendered it the de facto 
government of Costa Rica, irrespective of recognition by other states. 
States which come into existence when granted independence by a former 
sovereign, however, appear to enjoy a special position with respect to the requirement 
of effective and stable control. For example, the Belgian Congo (later Zaire) was 
granted independence in 1960 by Belgium, but the successor government immediately 
faced a rebellion in the country's richest province, Katanga. Moreover, the 
government was bankrupt, divided and unable to prevent anarchy. Belgian and United 
Nations troops intervened to suppress the rebellion and restore order. Yet the Congo 
was widely recognised, and it was granted immediate UN membership. 
Thus there is a presumption in favour of states that have acquired title through 
non-revolutionary means; the Congo government was recognised as sovereign despite 
its almost total inability to govern. The secessionist Republic of Finland gained 
legitimacy only after it was able to rule without the assistance of foreign troops, and 
the Tinoco opinion suggests that a government that comes to power by overthrowing a 
previous one will have to establish peaceful and thorough control of its territory 
before it even becomes the de facto government. Of course, the Government of 
Jammu and Kashmir gained sovereignty over its territory by a grant of independence 
from Britain, having held a semi-autonomous position within the British Empire for 
one hundred years before that. But large portions of the country were in the hands of 
rebels, the Maharaja had to flee the capital city with his family and belongings, and he 
had to seek the intervention of foreign troops. In light of the circumstances under 
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which the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession to India, it is questionable 
whether his government had sufficient control of the country to conclude the treaty. 
In the case of Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, the ICJ considered the validity of a 
maritime boundary delimited between the two countries by their former colonial 
masters Portugal and France. Guinea-Bissau claimed that the 1960 Franco-Portuguese 
boundary treaty was invalid because the Guinea-Bissau liberation movement had 
progressed to the point where Portugal lacked the capacity to conclude treaties 
affecting Guinea-Bissau. Rejecting that argument on the grounds that the liberation 
movement had not made sufficient progress by 1960, the ICJ went on to indicate that 
in certain cases of "national liberation" a colonial government's capacity to conclude 
treaties can be limited. A national liberation movement gains "international impact," 
according to the Court, when the government has to "resort to means which are not 
those used normally to deal with occasional disturbances," or to "extraordinary 
measures to ensure the normal conduct of civil activities." Thus the Court indicated 
that once that point of international impact has been reached, the government cannot 
conclude treaties affecting the territorial integrity of the country. 
It is uncertain whether such a standard would nullify the Maharaja's accession 
to India. For one thing, the rule applied by the ICJ in the Guinea-Bissau case is an 
extension of the doctrine of self-determination for colonised peoples, in that it 
establishes a legal mechanism by which liberated countries can deny the validity of 
treaties concluded during the twilight of colonial rule. The implication is that once a 
liberation movement has taken hold, the colonial master no longer effectively controls 
the territory. However, as with the self-determination doctrine itself, this standard 
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would perhaps best be applied to cases of African or Asian countries engaged in a 
liberation movement against a metropolitan European power.64 
Yet the idea that a government's treaty-making capacity can be limited by a 
reasonably successful rebellion, coupled with the principle of effective, peaceful 
control, creates serious legal doubts as to the capacity of the Maharaja to accede to 
India. Although the Maharaja had ruled Kashmir since 1925, the Poonch rebellion had 
broken out almost immediately upon independence and made rapid territorial gains. 
And despite the Maharaja's legally sound method of acquiring sovereignty, he only 
effectively controlled Jammu and Ladakh, relying on foreign troops to shore up his 
position both before and after acceding to India.65 Indeed that accession was a direct 
result of the Maharaja's admitted inability to maintain order in Kaslimir.66 Thus the 
accession was accomplished under legally dubious circumstances. 
Some sources also allege that India obtained the Maharaja's accession by 
coercion67 According to this argument, the Maharaja acceded to India after the arrival 
of Indian troops in Srinagar, not before. Kashmir was therefore a warm-up for the 
operations that would prompt the Nizam of Hyderabad to accede to India in the 
following year. An application of the law of treaties to the facts surrounding the 
Maharaja's accession will allow an evaluation of that contention. 
Prior to the founding of the League of Nations, there was no provision in 
international law for nullifying a treaty on the basis of coercion. That view simply 
reflected the era's permissive attitude toward the use of force in resolving territorial 
disputes. After the establishment of the League, and especially as a result of the hard 
bargains driven by Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop, world opinion turned 
5 2 See Chapter Four below for a discussion of self-determination. 
6 5 Patiala State forces joined in the defence of Srinagar Airport from 17 October 1947. 
6 6 Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten requesting accession 
6 7 Khan, 82. 
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against both the use of force and the threat of force in procuring territorial concessions 
by treaty. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations expressly forbids the threat 
of force; additionally, Articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention prohibit the 
coercion of states and their representatives68 That a treaty is invalid i f coerced is now 
a settled matter of international law, as it was in 1947 6 9 
The question then is whether India used force or the threat of force to obtain 
the accession of Jammu and Kashmir. It seems unlikely that this was the case. The 
basis for the coercion argument is that India had troops in Kashmir before the 
Maharaja actually signed the instrument of accession, and that the Maharaja was 
therefore in no position to refuse the Indian request for accession.70 But the Maharaja 
was the one who originally requested military assistance; Patiala State forces, 
whatever their international status, were fighting on his side against the Muslim 
rebels; India offered assistance in exchange for accession; and without Indian 
intervention the Maharaja's government might have only lasted another few hours. 
There is some evidence that Indian regular troops may have arrived on 26 
October, the day before the instrument of accession was actually signed.71 Yet the 
Maharaja requested military assistance from India before those troops arrived. 
Although the Maharaja may have wished most for independence, accession to India 
was preferable to having his government scattered to the four winds by the rebels. It is 
true that India was in a good position to demand the accession of Kashmir, something 
6 8 Lenkin, 'Treaties, Coercion," EPIL, 528-532 
6 9 Rao asserts that even if the instrument of accession was coerced it is still valid (43). In debate at the 
Vienna Convention, the United States and Australia recommended that the coerced party have the 
option of enforcing the treaty, but that suggestion was not incorporated into the final draft. See Kearney 
and Dalton, 'The Treaty on Treaties," 64 AJIL 495 (1970). 
7 0 Hussain, 72. 
7 1 Lamb, 117. 
that it certainly wanted. But there is no evidence available that the instrument of 
accession was coerced. 
Additionally, some publicists have claimed that the instrument of accession is 
itself a fraud. Various factual assertions have been submitted to support the claim of 
fraud: for example, that the Maharaja never signed the document, that Indian officials 
forged his signature, or that the instrument of accession has never seen the light of 
day.72 Fraudulent conduct by a party to a treaty is grounds for its invalidation pursuant 
to Article 49 of the Vienna Convention. Yet there is little evidence for the charge that 
instrument of accession is a fraud. No one can prove that the document never existed 
by not being able to find it today. Especially in view of the circumstances of the 
accession, it is not inconceivable that the Maharaja signed it. The debate over fraud in 
the Maharaja's accession simply demonstrates that no point goes uncontested in the 
Kashmir dispute, which has been characterised by this sort of meticulous mistrust. 
Because of that contentiousness, Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General of 
India, made a statement pledging that India would confirm the accession by some sort 
of popular referendum.73 In his reply to the Maharaja's instrument of accession and 
accompanying letter, Mountbatten states that as the accession of Kashmir had been "a 
subject of dispute," the accession issue should be decided "by a reference to the 
people" as soon as order had been restored and Kashmir's territory "cleared of the 
invader."74 Mountbatten's statements appear to endorse the principle of Kashmiri self-
determination, and they have established for posterity the proposition that the dispute 
should be settled by plebiscite. The issue of self-determination is explored in Chapter 
Robert Wirsing, "War or Peace on the Line of Control?: The India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir 
Turns Fifty." BTB 2:5, 4. 
7 3 Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Han Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, 27 October 1947. 
7 4 Ibid. 
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Four below; at the moment we are concerned with the legal effect of Mountbatten's 
statements on the accession of Kashmir to India. 
It has been suggested that Mountbatten's letter contractually bound India to 
hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, and that the accession will never be final in the absence 
of a plebiscite confirming it. That contention may be supported on two grounds. The 
first is that Mountbatten's letter amounts to a rider to the treaty and therefore confers 
an obligation on India by the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The instrument of accession was indeed a treaty under international law.7 5 As 
concerns the contention that Mountbatten's letter is part of the treaty: Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention provides that correspondence between the two contracting parties 
that is related to the treaty shall be used in construing the terms of the treaty.76 
However, the terms of the letter, even i f one accepts them as addenda to the 
instrument of accession, provide for a "reference to the people." The ambiguity of that 
phrase is further compounded by the condition that the "reference" will only take 
place once "peace and order" were restored, and the land "cleared of the invader." 
Such terms may be defined in any number of ways.77 A more fundamental objection 
to the argument that Mountbatten's letter creates a contractual obligation for India to 
hold a plebiscite is that any treaty between Kashmir and India ceased to operate upon 
the extinction of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Bilateral treaties terminate by the 
extinction of at least one of the contracting parties.78 In the instrument of accession, 
the Maharaja acceded to India on the subjects of defence, external affairs and 
7 5 This is assuming for the sake of argument that the treaty is not invalid ab initio on the grounds that 
the Maharaja lacked competency. 
7 6 Hussain, 60-61. 
7 7 The US delegation to the UN noted in a position paper that it would be entirely possible for India, in 
1948, to hold a plebiscite based on the extant electoral rolls in Jammu and Kashmir State. Those rolls 
were said to contain only 7% of the total population of the state, those included being 
disproportionately Hindu. 
7 8 Michael Akehurst, 'Treaties, Termination " EPIL, 989. 
communications. Although Kashmir retained "sovereignty" in all other areas, the state 
could be said to be extinct the minute it no longer possessed all the essential criteria 
for statehood. In this case the capacity for foreign relations had been permanently 
ceded to India.79 India followed up its acquisition of sovereignty with an occupation 
of Kashmir by its troops. The instrument of accession, as a treaty, could not continue 
to operate between Kashmir and India even after the extinction of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir; nor could it operate between India and Pakistan, as Pakistan was not a 
party to the treaty. 
The second way that Mountbatten's letter may have contractually bound India 
to hold a plebiscite is through the principle of unilateral declaration. Under certain 
circumstances, unilateral declarations may give rise to international legal 
obligations.80 Brownlie writes that a state "may evidence a clear intention to accept 
obligations vis-a-vis certain other states by a public declaration which is not an offer 
or otherwise dependent on reciprocal undertakings from the states concerned."81 
Public, official statements expressing the intention to be bound can create legal 
obligations for states. A look at the development and application of this principle will 
provide some insight into its relevance here. 
The principle of unilateral declaration emanates from the Eastern Greenland 
case, in which the PCIJ considered competing Danish and Norwegian territorial 
claims.82 In the course of negations between Denmark and Norway prior to 
international arbitration, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ihlen stated to his Danish 
counterpart that Denmark's plans to treat Greenland as its own sovereign territory 
would "meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway." Denmark contended that 
7 9 Some writers call this "partial extinction." 
8 0 Shaw, 95. 
8 1 Brownlie, 643. 
82 The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53 (1933). 
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Ihlen's statement amounted to Norwegian recognition of Danish sovereignty over 
Greenland, an argument that the PC1J ostensibly rejected. However, the Court found 
that because the "Men Declaration" had been made in an official capacity regarding a 
matter within the purview of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the declaration 
therefore bound Norway to the course of action set out in the Ihlen Declaration.83 
The principle of unilateral declaration proved decisive in the 1974 Nuclear 
Tests case, in which Australia and New Zealand brought an action against France to 
stop above-ground French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. While the case was 
pending, the French Foreign Minister stated that France had completed all its tests for 
that year would no longer test nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Upon France's 
request, the Court dismissed the action, citing the legally binding nature of the 
Foreign Minister's declaration. In evaluating statements by the French president and 
foreign minister, the ICJ held that France's intention to be bound, coupled with the 
public and official nature of the French statements, created a legal obligation for 
France to cease atmospheric nuclear tests.84 
The principle also figured prominently in the 1986 Frontier Dispute case. In 
1974, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) and Mali had come to blows over a small strip 
of land on their shared border, accordingly, a special commission was established 
under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the 
boundary dispute. Speaking at a press conference in 1975, the Head of State of Mali 
said that even i f the commission ruled against Mali, he would accept its findings. The 
commission ruled in favour of Burkina Faso, but Mali nevertheless took the case to 
the ICJ for arbitration. Burkina Faso argued that the Malian statements amounted to a 
8 3 Ibid. 
84 Nuclear Tests case, 1974 ICJ Reports, 3. 
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unilateral declaration that Mali would accept the commission's findings in any case, 
thus estopping Mali from bringing the ICJ action. Rejecting that argument, the ICJ 
found that there had been no intention on the part of the Head of State of Mali to be 
legally bound by his statements.85 
Also in 1986, the ICJ considered the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, 
in which Nicaragua brought action against the United States over the US policy of 
providing technical support to the Contra insurgency. The US justified its intervention 
by citing, inter alia, a 1979 declaration by the Nicaragua government before the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in which Nicaragua pledged to hold free 
elections. The elections were never held. By not upholding its commitment, the US 
argued, Nicaragua had rendered itself liable to intervention. The ICJ rejected the 
American argument as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state 
sovereignty. Regarding the promise made by Nicaragua at the OAS, the Court found 
that the Nicaraguan statements did not amount to a formal offer, which i f accepted, 
would constitute a promise in law. Nicaragua's statements were held to be purely 
political in nature. They were not, in the opinion of the Court, evidence of 
Nicaragua's intention to be bound to the other member states of the OAS. They were 
merely suggestions for how future Nicaraguan governments should be formed.86 
Unilateral declarations create obligations for states when those declarations 
are made publicly and officially, and with the intention of legally binding the state to 
a particular course of action. Did certain statements by Mountbatten and Nehru on the 
subject of a plebiscite for Kashmir rise to the level of an international obligation? 
Although it does not mention Pakistan specifically, Mountbatten's letter accepting the 
1986 ICJ Reports, 554. 
1986 ICJ Reports, 132. 
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Maharaja's accession acknowledges that accession had been disputed. It also 
expresses the wish that accession be settled by popular referendum as soon as 
possible. Further Indian government statements express a firm commitment to holding 
a plebiscite to confirm the instrument of accession. A 1948 White Paper states that 
India regarded the accession of Kashmir as "temporary and provisional until such 
time as the will of the people can be ascertained."87 That report cites a speech made 
by Prime Minister Nehru in which Nehru stated "that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately 
to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has 
supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and 
cannot, back out of i t . " 8 8 Before the United Nations in January 1948, the Government 
of India stated that the accession was to be conditional upon the vote of the Kashmiri 
people as to whether they prefer union with India, accession to Pakistan, or 
independence.89 
One condition that India has consistently attached to the plebiscite is that order 
be restored in Kashmir before the vote is taken. The existence of the Azad Kashmir 
government, the loss of the Northern Areas, and the activities of the JKLF and other 
underground groups have all given India reasons to postpone the plebiscite 
indefinitely. Some pro-Indian authors have even made the argument that the pledges 
made by Mountbatten and Nehru were purely political in nature and do not confer 
upon India any legal obligation to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, even i f peace and 
order are restored.90 According to this theory, the accession of the Maharaja is final 
and irrevocable and need not be made subject to a plebiscite. International law does 
not require that territorial cessions be ratified by plebiscite. India will always be free 
8 7 Sheikh Abdullah, 530. 
8 8 Ibid. 
8 9 Ibid. 
9 0 Agarwal, 44. 
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to alienate Kashmir, they argue, but India is not legally obliged to put that question to 
the Kashmiri people. 
Yet from the foregoing ICJ opinions, it seems that international law might 
indeed recognise the conditional nature of the Maharaja's accession to India. 
Mountbatten emphasised that the accession should be decided by plebiscite because 
of the distinct possibility that the Kashmiri people would opt for union with Pakistan. 
Nehru's statements suggest that India viewed its commitment to a plebiscite as 
binding. Because of the official nature of Indian statements and India's expressed 
intention to be bound to the commitment to a plebiscite, the accession of the Maharaja 
really cannot be viewed as final and irrevocable in international law, despite the fact 
that the plebiscite is now only a theoretical possibility.91 The Maharaja's accession 
was accomplished under circumstances that raise serious doubts as to his legal 
capacity to determine the fate of his country. The geographical, economic and cultural 
links between Pakistan and Kashmir suggested that Kashmir, while technically 
independent after 15 August 1947, would accede to Pakistan. The standstill agreement 
also points to the presumption that Kashmir would go to Pakistan. The Maharaja 
believed that he would not continue to rule Kashmir i f he acceded to Pakistan.92 
Recognising the inequitable and legally questionable nature of the Maharaja's 
accession, India committed itself to confirming that accession by a plebiscite. 
Although that plebiscite is unlikely ever to be held, the plebiscite issue continues to 
sap strength from India's arguments. 
Chapters 3 and 4 address the practical impediments to the plebiscite that Mountbatten and Nehru 
called for. 
9 2 Lamb, 128. "While never happy about joining India, [the Maharaja] believed that he was unlikely to 
survive as a Ruler in any capacity whatsoever if he joined Pakistan." 
E. Accession Counterpoint: Junagadh 
A short look at the fate of the princely state of Junagadh concludes our discussion of 
accession. Lamb calls Junagadh a "mirror image" of Kashmir; the case of Junagadh 
therefore helps to put the Kashmir's accession in perspective. Junagadh lies on the 
west coast of the subcontinent, on the Kathiawar peninsula. It is enclosed by India and 
has no border with Pakistan. At 3,337 square miles, it covers roughly the same area as 
Greater London and the Home Counties. Communications and transport were part of 
the Indian system. In 1947 the population was 80 percent Hindu and 20 percent 
Muslim. The ruler of Junagadh, the Nawob, was a Muslim.93 
Upon independence the Nawob opted to go it alone; however, on 15 
September he acceded to Pakistan. India immediately protested the Nawob's 
accession on the grounds that Junagadh was geographically contiguous to India; that 
the partition plan demanded that predominantly Hindu areas go to India; and that the 
people of Junagadh, not the ruler, should decide the question of accession. Pakistan 
replied that the partition plan did not apply to the princely states and that the ruler of 
each princely state was empowered to accede to the dominion of his choice without 
referring the matter to his people. In November 1947 Indian troops occupied 
Junagadh. In February, a "plebiscite" was held in which 190,000 voted to accede to 
India with only 91 votes for Pakistan. Unfortunately, in Junagadh, as well as in 
Hyderabad, the matter of accession was decided by force; this despite the widely held 
belief that a deal could be struck giving Kashmir to Pakistan and Junagadh and 
Hyderabad to India.94 But there would be no such deals. India and Pakistan would 
soon resort to force in the Kashmir dispute. We will now examine that use of force. 
9 3 Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto. The Nawob of Junagadh was the father of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, and the grandfather of Benazir Bhutto, also Prime Minister of Pakistan. 
9 4 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 69. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE USE OF FORCE 
India derives its title to Kashmir from the accession of the Maharaja. Pakistan 
emphasises irregularities associated with that accession, as well as the notion that 
Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan in accordance with the logic of the British 
partition plan. Both India and Pakistan claim the territory defined by the boundaries of 
the former State of Jammu and Kashmir, but those old boundaries no longer exist.1 
Instead, the following territorial situation prevails: Pakistan directly controls the 
Northern Areas, and indirectly controls Azad Kashmir, which is nominally 
autonomous. India controls the Vale of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. That 
arrangement has changed very little since the initial involvement of the Indian 
military in October 1947, when the Kashmiri rebels were pushed back from positions 
near Srinagar and the LOC began to take shape. Today, despite two additional Indo-
Pakistani wars (1965 and 1971) and the passage of over fifty years, the LOC is in 
roughly the same position as it was in the autumn of 1947. 
Armed conflict between India and Pakistan grew out of the Poonch rebellion, 
and although the fighting of 1947-8 began as a rebellion against the Maharaja, it was 
from the start a conflict over whether Kashmir would join India or Pakistan. The 
rebels aimed to secure the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and the Maharaja quickly 
turned to India once his own forces were on the ropes. In that way, the Poonch 
rebellion matured into the first Indo-Pakistani war and established the violent nature 
of the territorial dispute over Kashmir. The fighting also delimited a de facto 
boundary between India and Pakistan. As one might expect, the controversy over the 
1 Cf. the discussion of Chinese claims to the northern edge of the former princely state in the 
Introduction. Pakistan ceded territory claimed by China in 1963; India lost its portion of the Chinese 
claim in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, but it has not repudiated its claim to those areas. 
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use of force in 1947-8 is one of the main areas of contention in the Kashmir dispute. 
India and Pakistan each level charges of illegality against each other, and any analysis 
of the dispute must consider the manner in which force was employed. Accordingly, 
we will attempt to establish the factual background and the principles of law 
associated with the use of force, and then subject the positions of India and Pakistan 
to a critical evaluation in light of the applicable legal principles. 
A. Synopsis of Events 
Fighting began in Kashmir as early as July 1947. Communal violence involving 
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims had erupted in anticipation of partition. The violence 
gained intensity as independence approached. In areas where Muslims and Hindus 
lived in close proximity, such as the Vale of Kashmir or Jammu, reports of atrocities 
abounded. Consequently, large numbers of refugees were on the move: Hindus 
heading south and east, Muslims north and west. Civil order quickly broke down as 
violence became endemic and refugees took to the roads.2 As August 1947 drew 
nearer, the main challenge for the Maharaja was not the question of accession, which 
could hopefully be staved off through standstill agreements, but rather the 
maintenance of control over his own territories.3 Aware of the incipient rebellion in 
the Poonch district, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir ordered all Muslims to 
hand over their weapons and ammunition.4 Many complied with this order, and much 
of the materiel obtained from the Poonch Muslims found its way into the hands of 
Hindus and Sikhs, to be used against Muslims. That situation prompted the 
2 Estimates of the number of refugees in the West Punjab-Jammu-Kashmir corridor run as high as 16 
million, with an estimated 500,000 killed. 
3 Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 122. 
4 Poonch was, hofoe to around 60,000 veterans of the World War II Indian Army. 
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establishment of an informal supply chain extending west across the River Jhelum 
into Pakistan, by which the Poonch Muslims could rearm themselves.5 
Meanwhile, the Maharaja was never at any time able to make his writ run into 
the Northern Areas.6 His appointed governor for the region, Wazir Gansara Singh, 
arrived in Gilgit on 30 July to find the Gilgit Scouts as well as the majority of the 
civilian population in favour of accession to Pakistan. On 1 November, the Scouts 
arrested Singh, and they declared the area for Pakistan three days later. Thus by the 
time Kashmir achieved independence on 15 August, there was a strip of land from 
Hunza in the north to Poonch in the south where the population openly favoured 
accession to Pakistan. That situation allowed for the easy movement of weapons and 
personnel across the border from Pakistan into Kashmir, with or without the 
knowledge of Pakistani authorities. By mid-September, Pathan tribesmen from the 
Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan were filtering into Kashmir, augmenting the 
Poonch rebel forces, which had acquired a command structure. Pakistan Army troops 
"taking leave" on the Kashmir front helped to round out their numbers. The Poonch 
rebels formed the nucleus of the Azad Kashmir forces, which came into being on 24 
October with the declaration of the independence of Azad Kashmir. 
As the inadequacy of the Maharaja's forces became apparent, the Maharaja of 
the State of Patiala lent some of his troops for the defence of Srinagar. Upon the 
accession of Kashmir, the regular Indian Army moved in to engage the tribesmen and 
Azad forces, halting the rebel advance and creating a stable line of control. Finally, in 
May 1948, Pakistan committed its regular forces to the Kashmir front.7 As the 
prospect of an all-out war between the two new dominions looked more likely, India 
5 Lamb, 124. 
6 The Northern Areas are the remnants of the Gilgit Lease. 
7 Lamb, 162. 
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and Pakistan began negotiations resulting in a cease-fire agreement, and the LOC 
became an established feature of the Kashmiri landscape.8 
Organised righting began with the Poonch rebellion in August 1947. 
According to the Indian view, Pakistan illegally fomented the rebellion by permitting 
arms and materiel to pass over the River Jhelum into Kashmir. More provocatively, 
Pakistan permitted the transit of armed men along the same route on their way to the 
front. Pakistani sympathisers counter by noting that the deployment of Patiala troops 
in Kashmir before the Maharaja's accession amounts to aggression by India. That 
deployment on 17 October may well have triggered the principal invasion by the 
Pathan tribesmen on 21-22 October, which India denounces as a clear case of the 
illegal use of force. Furthermore, as regular forces of the two new dominions began to 
engage each other along the LOC, the legal status of areas controlled by Pakistan 
became an issue. India accuses Pakistan of aggression for deploying troops in any part 
of Kashmir. But is it possible that Pakistan could claim the right to place its troops in 
Northern areas and Azad Kashmir? Finally, the legality of the initial actions of the 
regular forces will be appraised. As with other phases of the Kashmir dispute, the 
armed conflict in 1947-8 has generated a series of allegations and denials. A review of 
the applicable principles of international law will be necessary before embarking on 
an evaluation of the Indian and Pakistani contentions. 
B. The Law of the Use of Force 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally forbids the use of force against the 
"territorial integrity or political independence" of any state. According to one eminent 
In 1947 the high commands of both armies were still British. Lamb points out that they maintained 
close contact despite the "strained relations" between their countries, and that such contact probably 
prevented a much wider and more destructive conflict. 
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authority, Article 2(4) is the "basic rule of today's public international law."9 Prior to 
the twentieth century, the concept of the just war was the province of theologians; 
international law gave every sovereign state the right to use force to pursue its 
policies.10 The apocalyptic nature of World Wars I and II prompted efforts to prevent 
future conflicts and limit the scope of those that were inevitable. Article 2(4) is the 
result of those efforts, and its provisions should be analysed briefly here.11 
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law provides some 
guidance on how to interpret Article 2(4).12 First, Article 2(4) bans wars of 
aggression. Second, states must not use or threaten force in order to solve disputes 
with their neighbours. States are also under a duty to refrain from using force in acts 
of reprisal. States must not use force to deprive peoples of their right to self-
determination and independence. Finally, states must not instigate, assist, or 
participate in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state, nor may they 
encourage the formation of armed bands for incursion into another state's territory. 
There is some debate as to whether the injunction not to use force "against the 
territorial integrity or political independence" should be construed strictly, to allow 
uses of force that do not explicitly contravene the clause, or broadly, to ban the use of 
force generally, but especially in the types of cases enumerated in the Article. The 
prevailing opinion seems to favour a broad interpretation.13 Thus there is a 
presumption in international law that the use of force is illegal. 
The central exception to Article 2(4) arises in cases of "self-defence." The 
customary definition of self-defence in international law comes from the 1837 
9 Jimenez de Arechaga, "Use of Force," EPIL, 1249. Article 2(4)'s ancestor is the 1928 Kellog-Briand 
Pact, which outlawed armed conflict. 
1 0 L.F.L. Oppenheim et al., Oppenheim's International Law, vol 1. 177-78. 
1 1 India and Pakistan were both members of United Nations by November 1947. 
1 2 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 781-2. 
1 3 Shaw, 784. 
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Caroline case. The Caroline was a boat docked on the American side of the Niagara 
River, which was being used to support an insurrection against the British 
Government in Canada. One night a group of armed men from the Canadian side of 
the river boarded the Caroline, scattered its crew, and sent it over Niagara Falls. 
Correspondence between American and British authorities over the incident 
established the basic elements of self-defence, namely, that there had to be a 
"necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation."15 Moreover, the chosen means of self-defence must be 
proportional to the threat; the need to act cannot justify actions that go beyond the 
bounds established by the original necessity.16 
Modern international law has upheld the basic doctrine of self-defence. Article 
51 of the UN Charter states that nothing in Article 2 shall "impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence." Individual self-defence means that a state may 
use force to protect itself in the event of "armed attack." For example, the Security 
Council upheld the right of Britain to use force to recover possession of the Falkland 
Islands in 1982.1 7 States may also group themselves together and assert the principle 
o f collective self-defence, in which an armed attack on one is treated as an attack on 
all. The philosophical underpinnings of NATO and the late Warsaw Pact provide 
recent examples of collective defence arrangements. 
An apparent corollary to the principle of collective self-defence is the concept 
of intervention. Foreign troops may be sent into a state upon the invitation of that 
1 4 2 Moore's Digest of International Law 412 (1906). 
1 5 Shaw, 787. 
1 6 Henkin et aL, Cases and Materials in International Law, 872. 
1 7 Shaw, 794. 
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state's government. This situation is most commonly observed in cases of civil war, 
in which a government seeks outside assistance in quelling a rebellion. Traditional 
doctrine holds that a foreign state may, i f invited, use force to assist the government 
but not the rebels.19 Rebel groups have typically been viewed not only as enemies o f 
the state, but also of the state system. Consequently, they have no international 
standing, and aid to rebels in another state is generally considered illegal. Customary 
international law does, however, require the neutrality of foreign governments when a 
rebel group attains the status of belligerency. Rebel groups become belligerent powers 
when they maintain an army and control a substantial part of the national territory. 2 0 
The essence of the doctrine is that once a rebel group has achieved a certain measure 
of success, the sovereign government can no longer claim the exclusive right to speak 
for the state. The very fact of civil war, as long as the contest is relatively even, places 
the legal personality of the sovereign government in doubt. Resort to foreign troops 
also brings into question the ability of the government to control its own territory, an 
essential characteristic o f sovereignty. 
In modem times, the doctrine of belligerency has fallen into disuse.21 It has 
essentially been supplanted by the doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
22 
of states, which prohibits interventions of any kind when an organized insurgency 
controls significant areas of the country or involves a substantial number o f people.23 
That doctrine maintains continuity with traditional notions of belligerency by 
1 8 Louise Doswald-Beck, 'The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the 
Government,"56 BYIL 189 (1985). 
1 9 Henkin et al, 947. 
2 0 Doswald-Beck, 197. 
2 1 The last rebel group to achieve belligerent status in international law was the Confederate States of 
America in 1862, which from 1861 to 1865 was thede facto government of the southern states in the 
American Civil War. Britain and France recognised the CS A's belligerency but stopped short of full 
recognition due to the CSA's inability to win a decisive battlefield victory and its unsuccessful attempt 
to comer the world cotton market. 
2 2 Doswald-Beck, 198. 
2 3 Oscar Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," 82 MILR 1620. 
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imposing an obligation on states to refrain from participating in civil wars that 
genuinely reflect an internal struggle for the destiny of the nation. As such, non-
intervention ties into the requirement in Article 2(4) that states refrain from using 
force in a manner that affects the political independence of a sovereign state. An 
established principle of state sovereignty is that states have the unfettered right to 
determine what type o f government wi l l prevail in their territory. In cases of civil war, 
a state is in the process of deciding what form its government wi l l take. Therefore the 
state's political independence would be compromised by the intervention of foreign 
troops, and Article 2(4) would appear to declare illegal all such interventions. 
Yet there have been countless examples of foreign interventions in civil wars. 
Most of those interventions, however, have been carried out on the pretext of 
opposing an earlier, illegal intervention. Such states, when they intervene, do not 
directly contradict the principles laid down in Article 2(4). On the contrary, they 
claim to be fighting in support of those principles.2 4 So-called counter-intervention 
may be justified on the grounds that the initial intervention poses a threat to the 
political independence of the state; that the faction supported by the counter-
intervening forces represents the state's political independence; and that the right of 
collective self-defence enshrined in Article 51 allows that faction to form defensive 
alliances when it becomes the victim of an armed attack. Counter-interventions often 
occur on behalf of rebel forces, as governments fighting insurrection can secure 
foreign aid without running afoul of Article 2(4) as long as the rebellion has not 
progressed beyond its infancy. I f the rebellion does reach maturity in spite of the 
Schachter, 1641-5 
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government's foreign-supported efforts to crush it, the rebels appear to be entitled to 
seek outside support o f their own. i 5 
C. The War and Its Participants 
Probably the best way to analyse the legality of the use of force in Kashmir is to look 
at the actions of each group of participants in the light of the law of the use of force. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that there were eight identifiable groups of 
forces operating in the Kashmir theatre at various points between summer 1947 and 
the cease-fire of 1 January 1949.2 6 It is possible to generalise about the objectives of 
those factions, and so place them in one of two categories: pro-India or pro-Pakistan. 
However, given the irregular nature of many of the forces, one must take care when 
assigning legal culpability to the dominion in whose interest those forces may have 
been acting. Another problem is the lack of reliable, detailed information about the 
course of events, especially in the early stages of the armed conflict in Kashmir, from 
August to October 1947. Alistair Lamb, the leading British authority on Kashmir, 
expresses doubts as to whether such information w i l l ever become complete.2 7 At any 
rate, holes in the record must occasionally be filled by accounts that are less 
authoritative than Lamb's. At those points, issues of provenance become paramount. 
Accusations of the illegal use of force imply that nations, and indeed certain 
individuals, may be guilty of war crimes. Accordingly such accusations must have a 
firm factual basis. Therefore, this paper wi l l not search for a guilty party; it wi l l 
merely analyse the extant record in the light o f applicable legal principles. 
2 5 Michael Akehurst, "Civil War," EPIL, 598. 
2 6 The Jammu and Kashmir State Army, the Poonch Rebels, the Gilgit Scouts, the Pathan Tribesmen, 
the Patiala State Army, the Indian Army, the Pakistan Army, and the Azad Kashmir Army. 
2 7 Lamb, 122: "What exactly went on in the remoter corners of the State of Jammu and Kashmir may 
never be described with certainty; but that the region suffered its share of disturbances is not open to 
doubt." 
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The issue of the use of force arises first with the coalescing of the Poonch 
rebellion in August 1947. In June certain residents o f Poonch had begun a campaign 
to secede from Kashmir. As Independence Day approached, campaigners began to 
clamour for accession to Pakistan. Public demonstrations continued despite the 
Maharaja's prohibition against them; this defiance resulted in the imposition of 
martial iaw. The demonstrations continued, now amounting to clashes with the 
Jammu and Kashmir State Army. Large numbers of civilians were killed. Meanwhile, 
in Jammu, Hindu extremists began attacking Muslim villages. Muslim Refugees from 
Jammu reported that the Jammu and Kashmir State Army had joined in the carnage. 
Consequently, the Poonch rebels engaged the Maharaja's forces in Poonch and the 
western part of Jammu. At this point, the conflict in Kashmir was a civil war between 
the Poonch rebels and government forces, notwithstanding that the issue o f accession 
overshadowed the fighting. The Maharaja's regime maintained its independent, 
sovereign status in international law, and its actions in suppressing the Poonch 
rebellion did not amount to an illegal use of force. 
The first issue to be considered is the legal significance of the informal supply 
chain stretching across the River Jhelum and west into Pakistan's North-West Frontier 
Province, an area with a reputation for weapons manufacture and trading. The Poonch 
rebels, whose arsenals had been decimated by the Maharaja's preemptive disarming in 
July 1947, received fresh weapons and ammunition from the Pakistan side of the 
river, probably from late August 1947. At this point there it is unclear whether 
Pakistan was officially involved in, or even aware of, the train of arms making its way 
to the rebels in Kashmir. There is also some evidence that individuals crossed the 
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border into Kashmir to aid the rebels, even at this early date. The question to be 
addressed is whether a state violates international law by its failure to prevent the 
privately directed flow of arms and munitions from its territory into a neighbouring 
state, where those weapons wi l l be used to support a rebellion against that state. 
Traditional international law distinguishes between the supply of arms by 
private individuals and the supply of arms by the state.29 The law governing the 
supply of arms by the state depended on the status of the belligerent party receiving 
those weapons: neutral states were obliged to refrain from supplying weapons to 
either party in an international war, or to the government in a civil war i f the rebels 
had achieved the status of belligerency. The supply of weapons to rebels in a civil war 
was prohibited. Private individuals, on the other hand, had complete freedom to 
supply weapons to anyone they wanted, at least in theory. That freedom could be 
circumscribed by interdiction efforts, but international law did not impose an 
obligation on states to restrict in any way the participation of their citizens in the 
international arms trade.30 For example, in the Spanish Civil War, France refused to 
intervene officially but permitted the private sale of weapons under the theory that 
France would not relinquish its neutral status simply by permitting such sales.31 
Since the development of that rule, however, states have tried to exert as 
complete control as possible over the export o f weapons from their territory. 3 2 The 
supply of arms by private individuals, although theoretically distinct from overt, 
official involvement in a conflict, still has the effect of supplying one party or another 
with weapons. Efforts by the international community to abolish armed conflict have 
2 8 Lamb, 124. 
2 9 W. Friedmann, "State Control over Individuals and Its Effect upon the Rules of International State 
Responsibility." 19 BYIL (1938), 131-2. 
3 0 Henkin et al., 947, note 1. 
3 1 Henkin etal., 946. 
3 2 Friedmann, 132-3. 
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led to legal restrictions on the movement of weapons across borders. It is now 
considered an act of aggression for a state to supply weapons to an insurgency in a 
neighbouring state.33 Moreover, the Institut de Droit, in its Resolution on the Principle 
of Non-intervention in Civil wars, makes no distinction between private and official 
supply. Section 2(c) states that states shall refrain from "supplying weapons or other 
war material to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be supplied."3 4 Section 
2(e) enjoins states from "making their territories available to any party to a civil war, 
or allowing them to be used by any such party, as bases of operations or o f supplies... 
for the passage of regular or irregular forces, or for the transit of war material." 3 5 The 
standards set by the Institut are not legally binding, and they are considerably more 
restrictive than those of traditional international law. Yet as the Institut's 
recommendations reflect current opinion, there appears to be a trend toward imposing 
greater liability on states in cases where their citizens are supplying weapons to 
insurgents. 
It is debatable, however, whether Pakistan was guilty of aggression by virtue 
of the mere existence of the informal supply chain. It is unlikely that Pakistan wanted 
to that flow to stop; it is also unlikely that Pakistan could have stopped it. No official 
Pakistani involvement in the supply of weapons is evident in the very early stages of 
the rebellion. One finds i t hard to believe that Pakistani officials were unaware o f the 
shipment of arms from Pakistan into Kashmir, but the extent to which they condoned 
it cannot be demonstrated. Although the Institut's standards appear to impose on 
states an obligation to maintain a cordon sanitaire around their borders, Pakistan's 
behaviour in respect of the movement of arms into Kashmir in August-September 
3 3 1986ICJ Reports, 132. (Nicaragua v. United States); G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Resolution on 
the Definition of Aggression. 
3 4 56 Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International, 1975. 
3 5 Ibid. 
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1947 probably does not amount to aggression against Kashmir under customary 
international law. 
More important is the issue of the movement of armed warriors across that 
border during the same period. There is no question that a massive lashkar of Pathan 
tribesmen crossed the Pakistan-Kashmir border and invaded Kashmir on 21-22 
October. The legal implications of that incursion wi l l be addressed below. For the 
moment we wi l l consider whether a determination of aggression can be made from 
the fact that small groups of armed warriors from Pakistan entered Kashmir to 
participate in the civil war in August and September 1947. 
According to Julius Stone, efforts by the international community to outlaw 
war have resulted in efforts by states to fight wars in ways that circumvent legal 
principles.3 6 To that end, one o f the main techniques employed by states in the 
modern era has been the use o f irregular troops. Known as "volunteers" or "armed 
bands," irregular troops have allowed states to wage war vicariously and still 
technically abide by the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). 3 7 Such 
behaviour, however, is clearly aggression under customary international law, which 
prohibits states from organising, encouraging, assisting, or sending armed bands into 
another state.38 Furthermore, states are forbidden from permitting their territory to be 
used as a base for armed bands,39 and they are required to exercise due diligence in 
preventing those groups from using their territory as a base.40 Those rules are 
reflected in the language of section 2(e) of the Institut de Droit's resolution, which 
would ban state sponsorship or even toleration o f armed bands. UN Resolution 3314, 
3 6 Julius Stone, "Hopes and Loopholes in the Definition of Aggression," 71 AJ1L 237 (1977). 
3 7 Article 2(4) says that "all members shall refrain" from the use or threat offeree (italics added). 
3 8 Stone, 237. 
3 9 Lillich and Paxman, "State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist 
Activities," 26 AULR (1977), 217. 
4 0 H O AgarwaL The Kashmir Problem: Its Legal Aspects, 47. 
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however, which provides a consensus definition o f aggression, sets a less strict 
standard for states 4 1 Article 3(g) prohibits the "sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands... which carry out acts o f force against another State o f such gravity as 
to amount to... [armed attack], or its substantial involvement therein."4 2 Resolution 
3314, when read in conjunction with customary international law, creates a general 
rule prohibiting state use of irregular forces. The presence of those forces on a state's 
soil wi l l create a rebuttable presumption that the state is using the forces in an 
aggressive manner. Only i f the forces are operating without the state's knowledge, 
with objectives unrelated to the foreign policy of the state whose territory they are 
using as a base, might the state might escape legal culpability. 
From the record it seems clear that Pakistani officials were aware that armed 
men from Pakistan were crossing the border into Kashmir to fight for the rebels 
against the Maharaja's forces, although Pakistan's leadership conspicuously distanced 
itself from the tribesmen.43 The centre o f the Poonch rebellion was only a few miles 
from Rawalpindi in Pakistan, and the irregular troops would have found it difficult to 
escape official detection in transit to Kashmir.4 4 Moreover, those men were fighting 
on behalf of the Poonch rebels, whose objective was the accession of Kashmir to 
Pakistan. Pakistan therefore stood to benefit from the success of that rebellion. As 
such, Pakistan's blind-eye approach to the issue o f armed bands does not insulate it 
from charges o f aggression. 
The incursion of armed bands into Kashmir in the late summer of 1947 
represents a general escalation in the conflict. With Jammu and Kashmir State forces 
4 1 Stone, 237. 
4 2 GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Article 3(g). 
4 3 Mohammed Ali Jinnah stated that he did not want to know about the movements of the tribesmen 
because "my conscience must be clear." See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 64. 
4 4 Lamb, 125. Jones (65) found evidence that Pakistan troops, in addition to disowning the tribesmen, 
were actually attempting to prevent them from reaching Kashmir. 
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back on their heels, the Maharaja turned to the Indian State of Patiala for help. Patiala 
is a mountainous state in the Punjab region, which had acceded to India on 5 May 
1947. Upon the Maharaja's invitation, Patiala State troops arrived in Kashmir on 17 
October and established defensive positions around the strategically vital Srinagar 
airfield. By virtue of its accession to India, Patiala had transferred to India 
responsibility for defence, communications and external relations. Patiala intervention 
thus represents, for all intents and purposes, Indian intervention. The Patiala 
deployment marks the first participation of non-Kashmiri regular troops in the 
Kashmir conflict, and the presence of those troops raises the question of whether their 
intervention took place legally. 
As set out above, the principle of non-intervention dictates that states should 
not intervene in the civil wars o f another state. States may, however, intervene at the 
request of the government as long as the rebellion does not control a significant area 
of the country or involve substantial numbers of people. Otherwise, intervention 
amounts to a use of force against the state's political independence. This rule places 
governments facing rebellion in somewhat of a catch-22: Requests for foreign 
assistance point to an inability of the government to control the country sufficiently; 
insufficient control of the country undermines the capacity of the government to seek 
foreign assistance. State practice, however, provides many examples of interventions 
at the behest of regimes whose positions were threatened, and a look at some 
examples of such interventions wi l l help clarify the state of the law in this area. 
In 1958, King Hussein of Jordan requested military assistance from Britain to 
solidify his position as monarch in the face o f an expected coup d'etat inspired by the 
recent deposition of King Faisal in neighbouring Iraq. The new Iraqi regime made one 
of its objectives the overthrow of the monarchy in Jordan, and it began a radio and 
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press campaign advocating violent revolution in Jordan. Shortly before the arrival of 
the British troops, several armed "infiltrators," allegedly supplied with arms by Syria, 
were captured along Jordan's border with Syria. The UK, citing Article 51 and 
collective self-defence, justified intervention on behalf of King Hussein as necessary 
to protect Jordan's political independence against the armed attack by Iraqi and Syrian 
agents 4 5 
In 1964 in the Congo, a UN peacekeeping force had been used to shore up the 
regime of President Tshombe during a rebellion that enjoyed wide support and 
participation. Although the peacekeeping force had departed, the rebels still controlled 
the capital city, Stanleyville (now Kinshasa). After Tshombe took office, the rebels 
denounced his government as a Belgian puppet and placed all white people under 
house arrest. Tshombe then invited Belgian troops to send a "rescue force" to 
evacuate civilians in the capital, a move that had the salutary effect of liquidating the 
rebel force holding the city. In the General Assembly, a number of African nations 
criticised Belgium's intervention as a sham designed to prop up the pro-European 
Tshombe regime. Belgium responded with the contention that the intervention had 
been purely humanitarian in nature. Regardless of the merits of that argument, it is 
noteworthy that Belgium did not plead government invitation. 4 6 
In 1979, the government of Afghanistan faced a widespread rebellion that 
controlled large portions of the country and had successfully encouraged the mutiny 
of a portion of the army. Afghanistan was at the time a Marxist-Leninist regime; 
accordingly, it blamed the United States and regional Islamic powers for the civil 
strife and requested military assistance from the Soviet Union, which was 
4 5 Doswald-Beck, 214. 
4 6 Doswald-Beck, 217-218. 
immediately forthcoming. Although it was alleged that Moscow manufactured or 
coerced its "invitation" from Kabul, debate in the UN over a resolution condemning 
the USSR centred on the Afghan-Soviet contention that the rebellion was the work of 
foreign powers. Many of the majority of nations voting to condemn Soviet 
intervention emphasised their belief that the USSR was doing little more than 
stepping in to crush a popular rebellion in Afghanistan. The USSR cited a 1978 joint-
defence treaty with Afghanistan and armed attack by foreign insurgents to justify its 
intervention under Article 5 1 . 4 7 
In each case, although intervention followed the invitation of the government, 
the intervening power sought some other justification for its actions, especially Article 
51's provision for collective self-defence. According to Louise Doswald-Beck, the 
tendency of governments to avoid justifying intervention on the ground of 
government invitation is one indication of the replacement of the traditional rule 
allowing intervention in a civil war with the principle o f non-intervention of states 4 8 
As to the Patiala intervention in October 1947, it is possible to suggest that the 
principle of inter-temporal law provides a clear justification, as the principle of non-
intervention may not have developed sufficiently by 1947 to the point where the 
principle regulated the intervention o f Patiala troops. Classical international law 
unequivocally permitted the intervention of foreign troops in a civil war at 
government request.49 It is clear that the Maharaja needed assistance in order to 
remain in power, and that his invitation was genuine. Yet the principle of non-
intervention derives from the UN Charter, which was in force in 1947. That principle 
ostensibly forbids intervention on behalf of the government in cases in which the 
4 7 Ibid, 232-3. 
4 8 Ibid, 213. 
4 9 James W. Gamer, "Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War." 31 AJIL (1937) 67 
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rebels control sizeable sectors of the state's population or territory, as was the case 
with the Poonch rebellion. 
One could argue for the legality of Patiala intervention on the grounds that 
armed bands were infiltrating Kashmir from Pakistan, augmenting the size of the 
Poonch rebel contingent, and that assistance from Patiala troops was necessary to 
defend Kashmir against foreign invasion. Although the Poonch rebels controlled 
sizeable areas in western Jammu and Kashmir State and enjoyed the support of that 
state's Muslim population, they were receiving aid from Pakistan in the form of 
weapons and irregular troops. No degree of official Pakistani participation in the 
rebellion can be demonstrated at this early stage in the conflict, but the norm 
regarding intervention would appear to render irrelevant the distinction between 
support by a foreign government and support emanating from the territory of that 
government. In both cases, a government fighting insurrection could reasonably make 
a plea o f self-defence. Patiala involvement almost certainly stemmed from India's 
desire to prevent the Poonch rebels from overthrowing the Maharaja and acceding to 
Pakistan; likewise, Pakistani toleration of the movement of troops and materiel 
through Pakistan found its basis in Pakistan's wish to see the Poonch rebels succeed. 
Pakistani involvement in Kashmir reached a new level after the deployment of 
Patiala forces. On 21-22 October, a large group of irregular Pathan troops, known as a 
lashkar, crossed the border into Kashmir. Numbering around 5,000 men, 5 0 the lashkar 
crossed into Kashmir at the same time that a large contingent o f Muslim troops in the 
Maharaja's army mutinied in support of the Poonch rebels. The Pathan tribesmen and 
the Muslim soldiers then combined for an all-out attack on the Maharaja's forces in 
Kashmir. Having secured large portions of western Jammu and Kashmir State, the 
5 0 Some Indian estimates of the size of this force run as high as 70-100,000. 
rebels proclaimed the independence of Azad Kashmir on 24 October. At this point 
Pakistan was overtly supporting the rebels, who now called themselves the Azad 
Kashmir Army. The combined strength of Patiala and Jammu and Kashmir forces 
could not contain the Azad troops, many of whom indulged in rampant pillage and 
booty-taking. As forces loyal to the Maharaja melted away in front of Srinagar, the 
Maharaja was advised to flee at once for the safety of Jammu. With no options save 
accession to India or surrender to Azad troops, the Maharaja chose the former. Full 
Indian deployment followed within twenty-four hours. 
At this point the conflict was no longer a civil war. Kashmir had surrendered 
its independence to India, which followed accession with a well-executed campaign 
against Azad forces. By spring 1948, the Pakistan Army was involved in the fighting, 
and what had started as a rebellion had turned into the first Indo-Pakistani war. India 
claims that Pakistan, through its military campaigns, was committing aggression 
against Indian territorial integrity in violation of Article 2(4). India brought its claim 
of Pakistani aggression to the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948. The merits of 
that claim and the role of the UN in the Kashmir dispute wi l l be addressed at length in 
the following chapter. At present it w i l l be necessary to examine the legal status of the 
areas to the north and west o f the LOC, which were controlled either by Pakistan or 
Azad forces by the time the Maharaja acceded to India. 
D. The Legal Status of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas 
India claims that the presence of Pakistani troops within the boundaries o f the former 
State of Jammu and Kashmir amounts to aggression. The Maharaja acceded to India; 
therefore, all territory formerly ruled by the Maharaja became Indian, and any 
Pakistani military presence there becomes prima facie illegal. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Ladakh, the eastern Vale of Kashmir and Jammu fell under Indian 
sovereignty after the stabilisation of the LOC, there would still be a question as to the 
status of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, which he on Pakistan's side of that 
line, The legal status of those areas wi l l be evaluated below, 
/ , The Northern Areas 
The Northern Areas are essentially those parts o f the former State o f Jammu 
and Kashmir that were leased to Britain in 1935 under an arrangement known as the 
Gilgit Lease. An area of great strategic importance, Gilgit was the northernmost 
fortress in Britain's intricate Indian defence system. Gilgit provided Britain with a 
vantage point from which it could more clearly observe the deceptive movements of 
imperial rivals China and Russia. Gilgit also served as a first line of defence in case of 
an attack on India by one of the aforementioned regional powers. To accomplish those 
twin objectives o f intelligence gathering and defence, Britain formed the Gilgit 
Scouts. A locally recruited unit commanded by British officers, the Gilgit Scouts were 
linked to Lahore in the West Punjab by telegraph and supply lines.5 1 In order to 
maintain even firmer control of Gilgit, Britain insisted on leasing the area from the 
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir starting in 1935 for a period o f sixty years.52 The 
Gilgit Lease bypassed the administration of the Maharaja and placed the area under 
the direct control of British India. 
In theory the Gilgit Lease would have reverted to the Maharaja upon the lapse 
of paramountcy on 15 August 1947, and Wazir Gansara Singh was despatched from 
Sringar to represent the Maharaja in Gilgit after the lapse of paramountcy. It is 
debatable, however, whether the Maharaja gained sovereignty over Gilgit with the 
lapse of paramouncy. The standstill agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan 
5 1 Lamb, 60. 
5 2 Lamb, 61. 
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stipulates that "existing arrangements" between Kashmir and British India would 
continue in "all matters."53 The Gilgit Lease was a treaty between British India and 
Kashmir establishing an arrangement in which Gilgit was administered directly by 
Britain, using a military unit commanded and supplied from Lahore. During the 
Maharaja's short-lived independence, the Gilgit Lease never came under his effective 
control. The standstill agreement should therefore have continued that form of 
administration under the auspices of Pakistan, at least until the accession of the 
Maharaja to India. 
Upon accession, it is submitted, the Gilgit Lease did not come under the 
sovereignty of India. It is well established that a treaty of cession cannot dispose of 
territory not possessed by the ceding party, nor may the acquiring party possess more 
rights over a territory than its predecessor had enjoyed.5 4 It is possible to view the 
Indian Independence Act as a treaty of cession as well, in which Britain ceded 
territory in its Indian empire to India, Pakistan or one of the princely states. For title to 
pass pursuant to a treaty of cession, it is necessary that the acquiring state take actual 
possession of the territory in question.55 The Maharaja was not able to take possession 
of the Gilgit Lease, as the Gilgit Scouts placed the Maharaja's Wazir under house 
arrest and refused to recognise the authority of Srinagar. Indeed no authority but that 
o f the Gilgit Scouts or Pakistan has been exercised in the area since. Accordingly, it is 
doubtful that the presence of Pakistani troops in the Northern Areas has ever 
constituted aggression. 
Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, Appendix I, 243. 
5 4 Shaw, 339. 
5 5 Brownlie, 131. 
2. Azad Kashmir 
The question of the status of Azad Kashmir is very similar, namely, whether 
the Maharaja's accession to India transferred title to India, such that Pakistan's 
support of troops in the area amounted to an act of aggression against India. 
The State of Azad Kashmir was the creation of the Poonch rebels, who on 24 
October 1947 declared the independence from Jammu and Kashmir of the areas of the 
Poonch and Vale of Kashmir districts that lay behind their lines. The new state had a 
government, with a president and minister of education. Its territory, however, was 
rather poorly defined. From 24 October, Azad Kashmir forces continued to advance to 
the east, toward Sringar, making territorial gains as they went; conversely, as Indian 
forces deployed on 27 October came into action, the territory of Azad Kashmir shrank 
from the east with the retreat of Azad forces. The population of the new state was 
consequently somewhat nebulous as well, a situation that was exacerbated by the 
mass movement of refugees. And while Pakistani regular troops were not yet 
officially in action, Azad Kashmir relied heavily on fighters from outside its borders 
to maintain control of its territory. It almost certainly lacked the capacity for foreign 
relations. While autonomous on paper, it has relied on Pakistan for its defence since 
coming into being. 
The Poonch rebellion had begun as a campaign for the secession of Poonch 
from Kashmir, and the subsequent formation of Azad Kashmir represents an instance 
of secession; a review of the rules regarding secession will be useful in determining 
the status of Azad Kashmir after 24 October. Strictly speaking, international law 
views secession as an internal matter. There is no international right to secede.56 
Successful secession movements will result in new states that meet the Montevideo 
5 6 Christine Haverland, "Secession," EPIL, 354. 
criteria; those states will probably also be recognised by third states once those 
criteria have been met. A lack of permanently defined boundaries, however, does not 
necessarily create an impediment to the existence of statehood; what is more 
important is the degree of independent public authority exercised by the new 
government.57 The test for whether a seceding state has reached independence was 
laid down in the AalandIslands case.58 A state formed through secession must have a 
stable government that is strong enough to assert its authority throughout the territory 
of the state without the assistance of foreign troops.59 In light of the fact that the Azad 
government relied on military support from Pakistan for its survival, it is unlikely that 
Azad Kashmir could be considered an independent state. 
If Azad Kashmir did not become independent on 24 October, its legal status 
would depend on the capacity of the Maharaja to accede to India. As set out in the 
previous chapter, that capacity was in doubt because the Maharaja did not effectively 
control the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Nowhere in Kashmir (outside the Gilgit 
Lease) had that control been less effective than in the areas that made up Azad 
Kashmir, which were in the hands of Azad forces (and essentially under Pakistani 
control) well before the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession. Thus although 
the claims of Azad Kashmir to complete independence were somewhat hollow, the 
Maharaja's government had no control over the area when it acceded to India. 
Accordingly, the presence of Pakistan-supported troops in western Poonch and the 
Vale of Kashmir does not present a clear case of aggression by Pakistan against India. 
5 7 David Ijalaye, "Was Biafraat Any Time a State in International Law?" 65 AJIL (1971) 551. 
5 8 Crawford, 137. 
5 9 Henkin, 248; Aaland Islands Case. 
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E. Conclusion: The Military Campaigns 
As winter 1947 set in, the fighting between Indian and Azad forces had reached a 
stalemate, with the former State of Jammu and Kashmir being effectively partitioned 
by what Alistair Lamb calls an "elastic but impenetrable battle front."60 With the 
spring thaw, a new round of fighting began, characterised by attacks and 
counterattacks. In the Northern Areas, the Gilgit Scouts pressed south and east into 
Baltistan; India responded with flanking manoeuvres that took the line of battle 
northward, higher and higher into the Himalayas. Attempts by Indian and Pakistani 
forces to outflank each other on this front led ultimately to the miseries of the world's 
highest battlefield, the Siachen glacier.61 
In the south, Indian forces had stymied the Azad advance and begun to press 
Azad forces deep into their own territory, threatening to cut Azad Kashmir in two by 
taking the "capital" city of Muzaffarabad and pushing west to the River Jhelum. 
Consequently, in May 1948, the Pakistan Army involved itself officially for the first 
time, committing troops to reinforce the Azad army and halt India's advance. Thus by 
spring 1948, the regular armies of the two new dominions were engaging each other 
all along the battle front, from northern Baltistan to southern Poonch. What had begun 
as a civil war between a Hindu ruler and some of his Muslim subjects had escalated 
into an armed conflict between the two new dominions. As preparations began for war 
between India and Pakistan, cooler heads prevailed: cease-fire negotiations began, 
which culminated with the agreement of a cease-fire line marking the effective limit 
of the sovereignties of the two dominions.62 Meanwhile, India had brought its case 
6 0 Lamb, 161. 
6 1 Robert Wirsing, "War or Peace on the Line of Control?: The India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir 
Turns Fifty." BTB 2:5, 19-20. 
6 2 Lamb, 164. 
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before the United Nations, charging Pakistan with aggression. This takes us into the 
next phase of the Kashmir dispute, to be addressed in Chapter Three. 
As to the use of force in 1947-8, it must be observed that the rules of 
international law regarding the use of force are most effective in preventing armed 
conflict from flaring up in the first instance. Accordingly, violations of those rules 
would most likely be found in the conflict's early stages: for example, in Pakistan's 
policy of permitting the use of its territory as a staging ground for armed bands, or in 
India's use of Patiala troops to prop up the Maharaja before he had acceded to India. 
Both India and Pakistan could probably justify the uses of their regular armies in 
terms of self-defence. India received the accession of the Maharaja at a time when the 
Azad forces were advancing east toward Srinagar. Therefore, India was defending 
itself against invasion. Pakistan, for its part, could make a similar claim: India would 
have cleared out the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir but not for Pakistan's defence 
of those areas. However, neither the British partition plan nor the battlefield had 
offered a lasting solution to the Kashmir question. The United Nations would soon 
become involved in efforts to break the stalemate. 
CHAPTER THREE: DIPLOMACY 
On 1 January 1948, India lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council against 
Pakistan. In its complaint, India alleged that the situation in Kashmir had reached a 
point where the maintenance of international peace and security was endangered.1 The 
essence of the Indian position was that Kashmir had become an integral part of India 
upon the accession of the Maharaja, and that the continued occupation of a portion of 
India by Pakistan-supported forces necessitated Indian military action against 
Pakistan in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter—action that could 
conceivably result in open warfare between the two nations.2 Pakistan replied by 
stating that the accession was legally null and void; therefore, Kashmir did not 
become a part of India, and the actions of the Azad forces merely represented a 
rebellion by the Kashmiri people against the oppressive rule of the Maharaja, who 
was now an Indian puppet.3 Both of those positions had been established long before 
the dispute reached the UN. The involvement of the UN does, however, represent a 
turning point in the dispute, because it marks the beginning of the international 
community's consideration of the Kashmir question. Moreover, debate in the UN 
produced certain resolutions recommending how the dispute should be resolved. 
Finally, the failure of the UN to solve the Kashmir problem highlights the 
irreconcilable nature of the Indian and Pakistani positions and suggests that self-
determination might be the only principle offering a solution. 
As set out in the preceding chapters, the accession crisis brought about a civil 
war in Kashmir in which both India and Pakistan intervened. Although it could be 
1 Rudolf Geiger, "Kashmir." EPIL, 72 
2 H O. Agarwal, The Kashmir Problem: Its Legal Aspects, 57. 
3 Alistair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 165. 
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argued that neither India nor Pakistan had a legal interest in what was an internal 
Kashmiri matter, our review of the process of the partition of British India 
demonstrates that Kashmir was destined to join either India or Pakistan. Both 
dominions coveted Kashmir, and consequently, both took steps to incorporate 
Kashmir within their territories. Those steps included supporting opposite sides in the 
Kashmiri civil war, which ultimately resulted in Indian and Pakistani regular troops 
facing each other across the LOC. Accordingly, the physical and legal positions of the 
two sides were entrenched before the involvement of the UN. We will now consider 
the legal basis for that involvement, the specific content of the resolutions that 
emerged from it, and the extent to which those resolutions were legally binding on 
India and Pakistan. It should be noted at this point that UN involvement was largely 
ineffective—India and Pakistan fought two additional wars over Kashmir in 1965 and 
1971, and conditions may deteriorate into armed conflict once again. The treaties 
concluded at the end of those wars and the course of bilateral diplomacy between 
Delhi and Islamabad are also essential facets of the dispute. Therefore this chapter 
will consider the gamut of diplomacy in the Kashmir dispute. 
A. The United Nations—Its Legal Status 
As stated above, India made its complaint regarding Pakistani aggression to the UN 
Security Council. Before considering the mechanics of Security Council involvement, 
it will be necessary to examine the status in international law of the United Nations 
generally, and of the Security Council in particular. 
The United Nations was established by the victorious Allied powers at the end 
of World War I I . 4 Heir to the doomed League of Nations, the UN was founded with 
4 The essential components of the organisation were formulated at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, DC, 
in October 1944 at a meeting of the governments of the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet 
Union. 
the goal of providing a worldwide authority for the promotion of peace and justice, 
and for the protection of the inherent rights of nations and human beings. Article 1 of 
the UN Charter, setting out the organisation's goals, comprises a mixture of lofty 
goals and noble principles, and in its recent practice the UN has focused on 
decolonisation efforts, regulation of self-determination, dismantling of apartheid, and 
amelioration of conditions in the underdeveloped world. The UN has six principal 
organs, designed to meet the various goals outlined in the charter: the General 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, 
the ICJ, and the Security Council. The structure of the UN is set out in the UN Charter, 
which serves as the organisation's constitution. The Charter is also a multilateral 
treaty to which all member states are signatories.5 Thus membership in the UN and 
adherence to the UN's basic law are regulated under customary international law by 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Interpretation of the Charter is the province of 
the ICJ, which has employed the theory of implied powers to expand the power of UN 
organs.6 Imitating the efforts of the United States Supreme Court to enhance federal 
power at the expense of the states, the ICJ has held that every organ of the UN has not 
only the powers expressly delegated to it in the charter, but also the power to do 
anything else that is necessary in exercising its express powers.7 Primary executive 
authority is vested in the Security Council, which has the ultimate responsibility under 
the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.8 
The Security Council is an outgrowth of the military alliance that defeated the 
Axis powers in 1945. First proposed at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the Security 
5 India became a UN member on 15 August 1947; Pakistan joined on 30 September 1947. 
6 Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 13. 
7 ICJ Reports 1949,174. Matter of Reparation for Injuries Suffered in UN Service. 
8 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 826. 
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Council is composed of fifteen member states, five of which have permanent seats.9 
All four Dumbarton Oaks governments have a permanent seat; France has the fifth, 
and the other ten are awarded on a rotating basis for two years, according to a 
geographical quota system. Except in cases of self-defence by states, the use of force 
in current international law is permitted only by the decision of the Security Council. 
Security Council decisions must include the unanimous approval of the five 
permanent members. Veto power does not extend to "procedural" decisions, but the 
distinction between procedural and substantive decisions may be challenged by any 
member, and the determination of procedural status is itself subject to veto by one of 
the five permanent members.10 Not surprisingly, the Security Council has been 
criticised for a lack of effectiveness, a weakness that was measurably exacerbated in 
the period 1946-1990 by Cold War divisions among the permanent members. Yet 
actions taken by the Security Council have consequently benefited from an 
undeniable international consensus, and the Council's authority has always been 
highly regarded." 
The precise role of the Security Council in settling disputes and enforcing 
settlements is laid down in Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the UN Charter. 
Chapter V (Articles 23-32) establishes the existence of the Council and its general 
mission to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VI (Articles 33-38) 
states the Council's jurisdiction in matters that threaten that peace and security, and it 
sets up a procedure for the submission of pressing matters by states. Chapter VII 
(Articles 39-51) enumerates the Security Council's powers to determine when a 
breach of peace has taken place, and to take remedial action, including the use of 
9 Before 1965, the breakdown was five permanent (same five) and six non-permanent members. 
1 0 Conforti, 70. Shaw, 826, notes that the rules of procedure allow the Security Council President to 
declare a matter procedural if his decision is supported by nine members of the Council 
1 1 Shaw, 827. 
force i f necessary. It further requires member states to assist in any operation 
undertaken by the Council under those auspices. Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) allows 
the Security Council to delegate its aforementioned powers to a regional authority, 
and Chapter XII (Articles 75-85) allows for the establishment of trusteeships in cases 
where continuous supervision becomes necessary to prevent chronic breaches of the 
peace.12 hi sum, the UN Charter gives broad and comprehensive powers to the 
Security Council to investigate, prevent, and manage cases of armed conflict 
whenever they arise.13 With the structure of the UN in mind, we can proceed to an 
evaluation of the disposition of India's complaint. 
B. The "India-Pakistan Question" 
India made its complaint to the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter. The 
Indian complaint mentioned the activities of the Pathan tribesmen and alleged that 
Pakistan's actions in abetting the rebellion against the Maharaja were endangering 
international peace and security. India requested that the Security Council prevent 
"the Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil from participating in or 
assisting in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir."14 It requested that the Security 
Council call upon Pakistani nationals "to desist from taking any part in the fighting" 
in Kashmir, and that Pakistan deny the Pathan tribesmen the use of Pakistani territory 
and supplies.15 This Indian position was based on the contention that the Maharaja's 
accession had unequivocally conferred sovereignty to India over the whole of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Yet India also expressed its commitment to a plebiscite to confirm the 
validity of that accession. According to India's proposal, the plebiscite would be held 
1 2 The UN Charter. In Louis B. Sohn, ed, The Basic Documents of the United Nations. 
1 3 Technically this applies only to member states, as non-signatory nations cannot be affected by the 
terms of the UN Charter. 
1 4 Agarwal, 59. 
1 5 Ibid. 
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once Pakistan had "vacated its aggression," in other words, once Pakistan had 
evacuated the portions of Jammu and Kashmir that it controlled. 
Pakistan replied by denying that its actions in aiding the tribesmen were illegal, 
portraying the situation as one in which Pakistan was aiding a popular revolt against 
the oppressive regime of the Maharaja. Pakistan claimed that the Maharaja's 
accession to India was invalid on the grounds that it was obtained via coercion, fraud 
and violence. Pakistan also raised the issue of the accessions of Junagadh and 
Hyderabad and asserted that India was involved in a massive land grab, making it the 
real aggressor.16 Pakistan also put forth a plebiscite proposal. Under Pakistan's plan, 
the Security Council would set up a commission, which would arrange for a cease-fire, 
to be followed by the removal of all outside troops from the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, whether Indian or Pakistani. A plebiscite would then be held under UN 
auspices.17 The Pakistani plan differed principally in its insistence that the plebiscite 
be conducted under international supervision; this was urged because it seemed likely 
that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir would use the restricted franchise 
established by its 1939 constitution. A vote taken under such restrictions would 
almost certainly have favoured India. India, however, was not eager to get the 
plebiscite under way until Pakistan-supported troops completely vacated the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan had cited the manner in which accession took place to 
justify its support of the rebellion against the Maharaja; likewise, it might cite a 
fraudulent plebiscite to justify an ongoing presence in Kashmir. Thus although the 
two states could agree that a plebiscite was the best way to resolve the dispute, the 
differences over how that vote would be taken were irreconcilable. The Security 
1 6 Lamb, 165. 
1 7 Ibid. 
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Council would therefore find it difficult to suggest a plebiscite proposal that would 
not favour one state over another. 
The Security Council's first resolution with respect to the "India-Pakistan 
Question" asked India and Pakistan to take "all measures within their power" to 
improve the situation and to refrain from actions or statements that might aggravate it. 
The resolution also requested that India and Pakistan inform the Security Council 
immediately upon any "material change in the situation" which should occur.18 In two 
subsequent resolutions, the Security Council formed the United Nations Commission 
for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).19 UNCIP was authorised to investigate the situation 
on the ground, to help India and Pakistan bring about law and order in Kashmir, and 
to arrange for a plebiscite. A resolution of 21 April 1948 made some more specific 
recommendations. It recommended that UNCIP officials proceed directly to the 
subcontinent to facilitate the cooperation of the two governments; that Pakistan 
should be asked to procure the withdrawal of Pakistani fighters from Kashmir and 
desist from fwmshing material aid to those men; and that India should be urged to 
reduce its forces greatly, to the minimum strength required for the maintenance of law 
and order. The Security Council also recommended that a coalition government 
should be installed in Kashmir and that the UN appoint a plebiscite administrator to 
supervise a vote on Kashmir's future. 
On 13 August 1948, the UNCIP, after meeting with Indian and Pakistani 
leaders, produced a series of proposals. The first part of the resolution called for a 
cease-fire order to apply to all forces under the control of India and Pakistan in the 
Jammu and Kashmir at the earliest practical date.20 The second part envisaged 
1 8 Security Council resolution S/651, 17 January 1948. 
1 9 S/654 & S/655, 20 January 1948 and 6 February 1948. 
^S/llOO, 13 August 1948. 
conditions for the demilitarisation of the state. Demilitarisation, in the context of this 
resolution, meant the withdrawal of Pathan tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals 
who had entered Kashmir for the purpose of fighting in the civil war, the subsequent 
withdrawal of Indian forces, UNCIP stationing of observers where necessary, and a 
commitment by India to safeguard human and political rights.21 Finally, in the third 
part, the two governments were to affirm their wish that the status of Jammu and 
Kashmir should be determined in accordance with the will of the people.22 
Pakistan did not accept those provisions immediately. Instead, Pakistan 
requested clarification of certain points, which resulted in the promulgation of a 
catalogue of "Basic Principles for a Plebiscite."23 Those principles included the notion 
that the accession of the Maharaja would have to be confirmed by a free and impartial 
plebiscite, and that that plebiscite would be held only after the UNCIP was satisfied 
that the cease-fire and truce agreements set forth in the resolution of 13 August had 
been carried out.24 With the clarifications provided by the resolution of 11 December, 
UNCIP passed a final resolution of 5 January 1949. UNCIP then reported to the 
Security Council that India and Pakistan had accepted its mediation plan.25 In 
accordance with the above resolutions, the Indian and Pakistani high commands 
instructed their forces to implement the cease-fire on 1 January 1949. The cease-fire 
line, with slight variations occasioned by the hostilities of 1965 and 1971, is today's 
LOC. 
2 1 Agarwal, 77. 
2 2 Geiger, 72. 
2 3 S/1196,11 December 1948. 
2 4 Agarwal, 79. 
2 5 That is, the resolution of 13 August as clarified by that of 11 December. 
en 
C. The Legal Implications of the UNCIP Resolutions 
The UNCIP resolutions established a regime for the peaceful settlement of the dispute, 
and those resolutions were accepted by India and Pakistan. The question emerges as 
to whether those resolutions became legally binding on the two countries. To answer 
this, an examination will be necessary of the legal mechanism by which those 
resolutions came into being, followed by a discussion of when and in what cases 
Security Council resolutions are binding. 
The Security Council investigated the Kashmir situation by the powers 
accorded to it under Chapter VI of the Charter. Specifically, Article 35 allows 
member states to bring to the Security Council any dispute likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.26 Article 36 allows the Security 
Council to make "recommendations" for the alleviation of situations brought to its 
attention under Article 35. Chapter VI, however, provides for the "pacific settlement" 
of disputes. Accordingly, the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VI are 
less clear than under Chapter VII, which allows for the use of force by the Security 
Council to restore peace after a breach thereof. The powers given to the Security 
Council under Chapter VI do not provide for the enforcement of Security Council 
recommendations. Thus the issue is not whether the UNCIP resolutions are 
enforceable under Chapter VII, but rather, whether international law imposes a legal 
obligation on states to follow recommendations for the pacific settlement of disputes 
that are made under Chapter VI. 
In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ had the opportunity to consider whether a 
Chapter VI recommendation by the Security Council was binding. The case emerged 
from a dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania over the international status 
2 6 UN Charter, VI, 34-35 
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of waters in the Corfu Channel. Albania had attempted to prevent the passage of 
British naval vessels through the channel, first by firing on those ships from shore 
27 
batteries, and later by laying mines across the main portion of the channel. When 
two British ships were destroyed by mines in October 1946, the United Kingdom 
brought the case to the Security Council, which passed a resolution under Chapter VI 
(Article 36) requiring the United Kingdom and Albania to submit the dispute to the 
ICJ.2 8 The United Kingdom unilaterally instituted proceedings before the ICJ, whose 
jurisdiction Albania challenged on the grounds that the Security Council resolution 
was not binding. Albania was subsequently judged to have acquiesced to the 
jurisdiction of the Court by participating in the merits phase of the proceedings. 
However, the question of the binding nature of a Security Council resolution was 
considered important enough to warrant separate consideration by some of the 
judges.29 
The United Kingdom, in refuting Albania's argument against the jurisdiction 
of the Court, suggested that Article 25 of the Charter, which requires member states to 
"accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council," created a legal obligation 
for Albania to submit to ICJ jurisdiction.30 The judges rejected the British contention, 
stating that the Security Council resolution could not be construed to create 
compulsory jurisdiction in this case/1 Specifically, the judges noted that any 
"recommendation" would necessarily be optional, and that recommendations of the 
Security Council were not "decisions" under Article 25. The conflict between the 
2 7 ICJ Reports 1948, 15. 
2 8 J. Mervyn Jones, "Corfu Channel Case," 35 Grotius 1948, 91. 
2 9 Ibid, 93. 
3 0 Albania, although not a UN member in 1947-8, had agreed to participate in Security Council 
proceedings, and agreed to accept all the obligations of a UN member state for the purposes of those 
proceedings. 
3 1 ICJ Reports 1948, 32. 
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obligation of member states to adhere to Security Council decisions under Article 25, 
and the recommendatory nature of resolutions under Chapter VI, can perhaps best be 
resolved by stating that resolutions made with the intention of binding the parties are 
binding, while others are not.32 Consequently, most Chapter VI resolutions are non-
binding. 
In 1971 the ICJ faced head-on the question of whether Article 25 of the 
Charter applies only to decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 
The Security Council had exercised its right under Article 96 to request an advisory 
opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of the South African administration of 
Namibia. Namibia had been administered by South Africa as the Mandate of South-
west Africa; the mandate was subsequently revoked by the General Assembly, and a 
Security Council resolution declared illegal the continued occupation of Namibia by 
South Africa. 3 3 South Africa refused to comply with the resolution, asserting that 
resolutions not made under Chapter VII powers are not binding on member states. It 
is not clear under which Charter provisions the Security Council resolutions were 
made in this case; what is certain is that they were not made under Chapter V I I . 3 4 
Two schools of thought emerged in the course of the consideration of the case. 
One essentially reiterated the arguments of the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel 
case, namely, that any resolution of the Security Council is a type of decision; Article 
25 thus requires member states to carry out Security Council resolutions regardless of 
the resolution's source in the Charter. Advocates of that line of reasoning pointed out 
that there is no exemption under Article 25 for Chapter VI resolutions. Moreover, 
Article 25 stands quite apart from Chapters VI and VII: i f Article 25 was intended to 
32Hussain, 183, fell. 
3 3 Rosaryn Higgins, "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Binding under 
Article 25?" 21ICLQ 1972, 271-274. 
3 4 Ibid, 276. The ICJ ultimately held that the resolutions were made under Article 24 of the Charter. 
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apply only to Chapter VII decisions, then it would have been included under that 
subheading. Finally, Chapter VII allows for the use of force to ensure compliance 
with resolutions passed under that chapter. Therefore, a mechanism already exists to 
render Chapter VII resolutions binding, and Article 25, i f applicable only to Chapter 
VII, would be entirely superfluous. 
The opposite view simply held that only Chapter VII resolutions are binding. 
It was further submitted, following the logic of the judges in the Corfu Channel case, 
that Security Council resolutions passed under Article VI are, by definition, mere 
recommendations.35 In the event, the Court took a contextual approach, holding that 
the Namibia resolutions were made under Article 24 of the Charter, which accords the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The Court went on to state that Article 25 does not apply only to Chapter 
VII resolutions, and that Security Council resolutions made under other chapters may 
indeed be binding i f an analysis of the language of those resolutions reveals that they 
were intended to be so.36 
As to the UNCIP resolutions in question, a look at the relevant language in 
those resolutions will allow an evaluation of them according to the ICY % Namibia 
framework. The resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 outline a specific 
process for settling the dispute. Those provisions are discussed above; their central 
components are cease-fire, demilitarisation and the plebiscite. The resolutions, 
however, are framed in this manner: the first (13 August) resolves "to submit 
simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan" proposals for a final 
The UK seems to have learned the lessons of Corfu Channel well—it led the charge against an 
inclusive interpretation of Article 25 in the Namibia case. Higgins, 279. 
3 6 1971 ICJ Reports, 52-53. 
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settlement of the situation. The second (5 January) merely acknowledges receipt of 
the "acceptance" by India and Pakistan of the resolution of 13 August along with 
certain supplementary provisions. Nowhere in either resolution is there any language 
suggesting that the Security Council had itself decided that the proposals contained 
therein were to be implemented. The language of the resolutions is consistent with the 
spirit of Chapter VI, which establishes the Security Council as an international 
mediator, investigating disputes and suggesting methods for their pacific settlement. 
The most imperative language found in Chapter VI is that of Article 36, which states 
that legal disputes as a general rule should be referred to the ICJ; however, even that 
language has been found to be non-binding.38 Moreover, according to Rosalyn 
Higgins, an informal rule "now endowed with the status of law" has emerged in the 
drafting of Security Council resolutions such that Chapter VII resolutions are binding, 
while those made under Chapter VI are not.39 Accordingly, it is doubtful that India 
and Pakistan would be required under Article 25 to carry out the UNCIP resolutions. 
That is not to say, however, that no legal obligation whatsoever derived from 
India and Pakistan's acceptance of the UNCIP resolutions. First, that acceptance 
could be said to have created a treaty between the two countries: a treaty is defined as 
an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law.4 0 Of course, an obligation may also be created simply by unilateral 
declaration of an intention to be bound. Both India and Pakistan asserted, in the 
course of debates before the Security Council, that an obligation to settle the Kashmir 
dispute could be based on the UNCIP resolutions that they had accepted. Therefore, 
one could say that India and Pakistan were legally bound to follow the terms of the 
3 7 S/1100. Italics added. 
3 8 That is, by the judges in Corfu Channel. 
3 9 Higgins, 283. 
4 0 Vienna Convention, Article 2. 
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settlement envisaged by the UNCIP resolutions, not because those resolutions 
themselves were binding, but rather because India and Pakistan had agreed to be 
bound by them. 
D. The Failure of UN Involvement 
Although the UNCIP resolutions created a legal obligation for India and Pakistan to 
pursue a solution to the Kashmir dispute in a specific manner, execution of that 
obligation proved problematic in two key areas—demilitarisation and the plebiscite. 
From Pakistan's point of view, India had committed to confirming the accession of 
the Maharaja by plebiscite, and its continued refusal to do so constituted a breach of 
the UNCIP agreement. India, on the other had, stressed the demilitarisation aspect of 
the agreement, pointing out that the plebiscite could not be conducted until Pakistan 
secured the removal of all troops from within the boundaries of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. The UN maintained its efforts to bring about a mediated settlement in 
Kashmir, despatching various eminent international figures to the subcontinent in an 
effort to bring the two sides closer through direct talks intended to bring about further 
agreements on how to implement the UNCIP resolutions. No such agreements were 
ever made; however, a brief sketch of the work of those mediators will highlight the 
development of the legal positions of India and Pakistan in the period 1949-1965. 
The first UN mediator was Security Council President A.G.L. McNaughton of 
Canada, who began work in December 1949. McNaughton proposed that the entirety 
of Kashmir (including the Northern Areas) should remain under the control of local 
authorities in the run-up to the plebiscite, subject to UN supervision. The 
McNaughton proposals also made a distinction between Azad forces and Pakistani 
regular forces for the purposes of demilitarisation. India rejected these proposals on 
11 
the grounds that they legitimated the concept of Azad Kashmir and did not require the 
evacuation of Azad forces.41 
Early 1950 saw the appointment by the Security Council of Sir Owen Dixon 
of Australia as UN Representative in India. Sir Owen, after a thorough tour of the 
region in that same year, produced proposals that were most notable for then-
advancement of the notion of "regional plebiscites." He proposed separate plebiscites 
for each of four regions—the Northern Areas, Jammu, Ladakh, and the Vale of 
Kashmir—thus allowing for the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be effectively 
partitioned between India and Pakistan. The fate of the first three regions would be 
predictable; only in the Vale of Kashmir would any fair vote be close. Contention as 
to the merits of the Dixon proposals therefore centred on the question of a plebiscite 
for the Vale of Kashmir, which revealed a gap between Indian and Pakistani notions 
of what form any plebiscite should take. Pakistan asserted that the plebiscite should be 
administered by the UN, in order to neutralise the influence of India or the pro-Indian 
Jammu and Kashmir government of Sheikh Abdullah. Pakistan also contended that 
the plebiscite should decide the fate of Kashmir as a whole. India conversely 
maintained that no plebiscite could take place until the evacuation of Azad areas, the 
same position it took with respect to the plebiscite component of the UNCIP 
resolutions. Dixon himself ultimately concluded that the LOC should become the 
international boundary, but the UN persevered in its efforts to bring about a mediated 
settlement in accordance with its resolutions. 
In March 1951, the Security Council appointed Frank P. Graham, a former 
United States Senator from North Carolina, to succeed Sir Owen Dixon. Graham also 
toured the region, studied the issue of the plebiscite and, like his Australian 
4 1 Lamb, 170. 
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predecessor, produced written reports of the highest literary standard. However, 
Graham was no more successful than Dixon. He encountered the same obstacles to 
settlement, namely, Pakistan's insistence that a plebiscite be supervised 
internationally and India's refusal to contemplate a plebiscite before Pakistan 
"vacated its aggression."42 Graham's lack of success prompted the Security Council to 
send Gunnar Jarring of Sweden to investigate. Jarring reported that he had been no 
more successful than Graham. The Security Council's resolution on the Jarring report 
requested that India and Pakistan avoid attempts to settle the matter unilaterally; it 
also recommended that Graham be sent back to the subcontinent to attempt a 
mediated settlement. Graham once again returned indicating that no significant 
progress had been achieved. Graham's efforts represent the last attempt by the 
Security Council to resolve the dispute before serious fighting broke out again in 1965. 
E. A Change in Circumstances? 
As the UNCIP resolutions were never implemented, the question arises whether 
circumstances in the region had changed such that the agreement between India and 
Pakistan to resolve the dispute according to the UNCIP resolutions became invalid. 
On 5 February 1964, Krishna Menon, the Indian representative to the UN, indicated 
that India no longer felt bound by the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 
January 1949.43 India contended that the basis for a plebiscite had disappeared 
because Pakistan had refused to remove its forces from the Azad and Northern Areas. 
Moreover, Pakistan's membership in collective defence arrangements with the United 
States (SEATO and CENTO) constituted a fundamental change in the strategic 
situation in Kashmir, and India had accepted the UNCIP resolutions under the 
4 2 Lamb, 176. 
4 3 Geiger, 73. 
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circumstances that had prevailed in 1949. Finally, India argued that by the 
incorporation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union as a 
constituent state, the pledge to hold a plebiscite became irrelevant: Kashmir was now 
an integral part of the Indian Union and a vote expressing a desire by Kashmiris to 
join Pakistan would be of no legal consequence.45 
Those objections by India raised will be critically evaluated below; first an 
exploration will be necessary of the general principle by which a state may terminate 
a treaty on the ground of changed circumstances. One of the most basic rules of 
international law is that of pacta sunt servanda, which holds that treaty obligations 
must always be honoured. I f states were allowed to alter or abrogate treaties at will, 
then the type of negotiation necessary for the maintenance of stability would not be 
possible. States simply could not trust other states to honour treaty obligations, and 
the state system would cease to function. It is possible, however, for circumstances to 
change so radically that the assumptions on which a treaty were predicated are no 
longer valid, giving rise to a situation in which the continued application of the treaty 
may be both contrary to the original expectations of the parties and an intolerable 
burden on at least one party.46 In such cases, states may invoke the principle of rebus 
sic stantibus as an exception to pacta sunt servanda and terminate the treaty. 
The principle of rebus sic stantibus, however, would provide such a clear 
avenue for abuse that its application must be severely restricted to cases in which the 
original intent of the contracting parties has been frustrated47 The traditional view is 
that it is applicable under conditions which would have negated implementation of the 
4 4 Gururaj Rao, The Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem, 355-6 ft. 261. 
4 5 Agarwai 144-5. 
4 6 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, 'Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus)" 61 AJIL (1967), 
897-8. 
4 7 HenkinetaL516. 
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treaty had they prevailed at the time of the treaty's negotiation. As such, the 
principle is analogous to that of "implied terms" in English municipal contract law : 
the principle attempts not to defeat the intention of the parties, but to fulfil i t . 4 9 It 
seeks a reasonable state of affairs by releasing states from obsolete treaty obligations, 
as contrasted with the unreasonable situation that would result from literal adherence 
to an obsolete treaty's express provisions.50 It should be emphasised that the trend has 
been toward a very restrictive interpretation of rebus sic stantibus, and today it is 
agreed that the principle is to be applied only in the most exceptional circumstances. 
Revision is the preferred method for bringing an old treaty up to date; application of 
rebus sic stantibus terminates the treaty.51 
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides a codification of customary 
international law as it pertains to rebus sic stantibus. Article 62 states that a 
"fundamental change of circumstances" that was unknown and unforeseen by the 
parties may invalidate a treaty i f "the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty" and i f the effect 
of continued enforcement of the treaty would be "radically to transform the extent of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty."52 Judicial application of the 
principle has been rare. Tribunals have generally avoided giving it effect, preferring 
instead to make their determinations on other legal grounds, or finding that although 
circumstances might have changed, those circumstances were not the bases on which 
Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 
2ed, 1945, p. 1524. 
4 9 The "implied term" is that the validity of the contract is subject to the conditions that prevailed when 
it was executed. 
3 0 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 336-7. Waldock 6th edition, 1963. 
5 1 Michael Akehurst, 'Treaties, Termination." EPIL, 989. 
5 2 Vienna Convention, Article 62. 
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the parties entered into the treaty. Yet tribunals have had occasion to consider the 
merits of rebus sic stantibus; a look at two of those decisions should shed some light 
on India's claim that its adherence to the UNCIP resolutions was no longer required 
due to a fundamental change in circumstances. 
In the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice considered the question of whether certain Franco-Swiss treaties 
concluded after the Napoleonic Wars were still valid.5 4 According to those treaties, 
free zones benefiting the Canton of Geneva were established within French territory. 
France challenged the continued existence of the free zones on the grounds that the 
Treaty of Versailles, ending World War I , had brought about conditions that were no 
longer conducive to the maintenance of the zones. France also argued that the 
consolidation of the Confederation Helevitique (Switzerland) over the course of the 
nineteenth century had changed the legal status of the Canton of Geneva thereby 
invalidating the original treaties.55 The Court ruled that as France's case failed on the 
facts,56 an interpretation of rebus sic stantibus would not be necessary; however, the 
Court went on to note that circumstances alleged by France to have changed were not 
those on which the treaty was based, implying that the change in circumstances must 
relate strictly to the treaty in question.57 
The ICJ gave more thorough consideration to the principle of rebus sic 
stantibus in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case.58 The case was brought before the ICJ as 
a result of an exchange of notes between the UK and Iceland in 1961, according to 
5 3 Henkin,519. 
5 4 PCIJ Series C, No. 17, Vol. 1 (1932). 
5 5 Gyorgy Haraszti, 'Treaties and Fundamental Change of Circumstances," HR 146 1975 III, p. 39-40. 
5 6 Switzerland did not sign the Treaty of Versailles, nor had France raised the issue of Geneva's legal 
status within a sufficient amount of time. 
5 7 Hussain, 200 
5 8 ICJ Reports 1973, 3. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Iceland). 
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which the UK recognised Iceland's claim of a twelve-mile exclusive fisheries zone in 
exchange for a promise by Iceland that it would submit any future claims in excess of 
twelve miles to the ICJ for arbitration. In 1972 Iceland extended its claim to fifty 
miles, prompting the UK to bring the ICJ action. Iceland denied that the exchange of 
notes established ICJ jurisdiction, alleging that improvements in fishing techniques 
since 1961 had made it possible for British trawlers to decimate stocks in the waters 
adjacent to Iceland, and that international legal opinion had become more receptive to 
extensions of exclusive fishing zones beyond twelve miles. The Court declined to 
consider the facts, focussing instead on the question of jurisdiction as established by 
the exchange of notes. Effectively construing Article 62, the Court declared that the 
change in circumstances, while relevant to the merits of the case, did not relate to the 
basis on which the UK and Iceland had agreed to ICJ jurisdiction. Moreover, although 
circumstances had changed, they did not result in a radical transformation of the 
obligation created by the original agreement, namely, to submit disputes to the ICJ.5 9 
Thus the ICJ indicated the framework under which rebus sic stantibus claims would 
be adjudicated. With that in mind, we can now proceed to an evaluation of India's 
claims of changed circumstances. 
First, India contended that it was no longer bound by its pledge to a plebiscite 
in accordance with the UNCIP resolutions because Pakistan had failed to "vacate its 
aggression" by evacuating the Azad and Northern Areas. The UNCIP resolutions, 
inter alia, call for the withdrawal of Pakistan Army troops as well as persons who 
entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of fighting.60 The resolutions 
also state that once the Pakistan-controlled areas were evacuated, they would continue 
Ibid. 
1 S/1100, Part 11(A). 
79 
to be administered by local authorities. It is clear from the record not only that 
Pakistan did not withdraw the aforementioned personnel, but the distinction between 
them and the local authorities was a fine one indeed.61 Accordingly it must have been 
difficult to determine the precise extent of Pakistan's compliance, but the issue is 
whether Pakistan's failure to comply would have amounted to a fundamental change 
of circumstances such that India was no longer bound by the UNCIP resolutions. 
With respect to the failure of Pakistan to evacuate the areas it controlled, India 
in fact alleged that circumstances had remained the same. Such circumstances could 
probably be cited to justify India's temporary non-performance of its obligations, as 
Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention allows a party to a multilateral treaty that is 
specially affected by a breach of that treaty to suspend operation of the treaty between 
itself and the defaulting state.62 However, those circumstances would probably not 
result in complete termination of the obligation. In the Tacna-Arica arbitration, for 
example, the arbitrator held that an agreement to hold a plebiscite in former Peruvian 
territory occupied by Chile would not be terminated by allegations of administrative 
abuses unless it could be shown that the consequence of those abuses operated to 
frustrate the purpose of the agreement.63 Pakistan's withdrawal was required by the 
UNCIP resolutions, but Pakistan's continued failure to withdraw its forces did not 
suddenly result in a frustration of the purpose of those resolutions. Moreover, India's 
obligations under the UNCIP resolutions were multilateral ones, made before the UN. 
Other nations therefore had an interest, technically speaking at least, in seeing those 
resolutions implemented.64 Therefore, the position of Pakistan Army and Azad troops 
6 1 Lamb, 172. 
6 2 Vienna Convention, Article 60 
6 3 2RIAA,921 (1925). 
6 4 Shaw, 668. 
probably does not support India's claim that its obligations under the UNCIP 
resolutions had been terminated. 
India also alleged a fundamental change in circumstances as a result of 
Pakistan's entry into a military alliance with the United States in the form of 
membership in SEATO and CENTO.65 According to this view, Pakistan's entry into 
those alliances had created a security situation in Kashmir that was fundamentally 
different from the one which prevailed at the time that India accepted the UNCIP 
resolutions. This contention, however, fails to be persuasive. Although the balance of 
power in the subcontinent might have changed with the new alliances, the 1949 
balance of power was not the basis for India's agreement to subject its possession of 
Kashmir to a plebiscite. Pakistan's new strategic partnerships also did not result in a 
radical transformation of India's obligations with respect to the UNCIP resolutions; 
confirmation of accession by plebiscite remained the central obligation. As such, it is 
difficult to substantiate India's claim of a fundamental change in circumstances as a 
result of Pakistani membership in SEATO and CENTO. 
India's final argument for a fundamental change in circumstances bears a 
closer examination. India argued that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had become 
incorporated into India by virtue of the Maharaja's accession, and that Kashmir had 
become an integral part of the Indian Union through the acceptance of the Indian 
constitution by the Jammu and Kashmir assembly. The implications of those 
developments, according to India, were twofold: First, acceptance of the constitution 
by the Jammu and Kashmir assembly meant that the territory had become fully 
integrated into India, precluding the possibility that India could relinquish Kashmir 
6 5 This alliance triggered the Cold-War stagnation of the Security Council, characterised by consistent 
Soviet efforts to prevent an international disposition of the dispute. 
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after an internationally supervised plebiscite. Thus the plebiscite was unnecessary as 
its results in any case would be inconsequential.66 Second, the assembly of Kashmir 
represented the will of the Kashmiri people, and the assembly's vote to integrate with 
India constituted a reference to that will. As the people's wishes had been ascertained, 
there was no need to put the question to them again via plebiscite.67 Each of those 
contentions will be evaluated in turn. 
Princely states joined India first by acceding to Delhi on the subjects of 
foreign affairs, communications and defence; those states would then complete 
integration by ratifying the Indian constitution once it had been framed. The Indian 
constitution emerged in January 1950 and conferred a special status on Jammu and 
Kashmir. While other states joined the Indian Union as Part (B) states,68 Article 370 
of the Indian constitution established a position of greater autonomy for Jammu and 
Kashmir within the union by limiting the power of Delhi to those subjects on which 
the Maharaja had acceded.69 It left residual power in the hands of a duly constituted 
Kashmir assembly, which was of course left free to cede additional powers to Delhi 
through mutual arrangement.70 That assembly was convened in October 1951, and in 
1957 the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution came into force. Establishing the structure 
of state government in accordance with Article 370, the Jammu and Kashmir 
Constitution contained provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme 
Court and the Indian Comptroller and Auditor-General.71 By establishing its own state 
constitution according to the terms of the Indian Constitution, the State of Jammu and 
6 6 Paras Diwan, "Kashmir and the Indian Union: The Legal Position," 346. 
6 7 Lamb, 192-3. 
6 8 Part (B) states were the former princely states. Part (A) states were the former provinces of British 
India. 
6 9 According to Lamb, Article 370 was essentially the work of Sheikh Abdullah, the pro-Indian Union 
Muslim leader of Kashmir installed by India after accession. Abdullah wanted independence for 
Kashmir and sought principally to avoid union with Pakistan. 
7 0 Constitution of India, Article 370. 
7 1 Lamb, 203. 
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Kashmir became fully integrated into the Indian Union. Unilateral secession is 
prohibited by the Indian Constitution; likewise, the Indian Union may not expel a 
member state against its will. Departures from the union by states may be 
accomplished only with the consent of both the state and the union.72 
It must be determined whether the legal position of Kashmir within the Indian 
Union after 1957 constituted a change in circumstances significant enough to relieve 
India of its obligations under the UNCIP resolutions. It is true that the Indian Union, 
prior to 1957, had no obligation under its own constitution to maintain Kashmir as 
part of its territory, and that such an obligation may have arisen as a result of full 
incorporation into that union by the Jammu and Kashmir assembly. However, the 
international status of Kashmir would not necessarily have changed by such means; 
India of course bases its claim to Kashmir on the accession of the Maharaja. 
Moreover, it is an established principle of international law that a state may not cite a 
conflict with its municipal law as a justification for nullifying a treaty 7 3 In the Polish 
Nationals case, the PCIJ noted that although application of a state's constitution is an 
internal matter, a state "cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution 
with a view to evading obligations."74 Finally, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention 
provides that a state "may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty."75 Although India's commitment under the UNCIP 
resolutions to subject the status of Kashmir to a plebiscite may be at variance with 
provisions of the Indian Constitution, those provisions may not be cited to support the 
proposition that India is no longer bound by the UNCIP resolutions. 
7 2 Diwan, 346. 
7 3 Shaw, 662. 
7 4 Hussain, 210-211; PCIJ Series A/B, No. 44, p.24 (1931). 
7 5 Vienna Convention, Article 27. 
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A related notion is that India was no longer bound to its plebiscite 
commitment because the duly constituted assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had 
expressed the will of the people by ratifying a constitution that integrated the state 
fully within the Indian Union. In evaluating this contention it should first be noted 
that only about five percent of the potential electorate actually participated in 
elections for representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Abdullah's National 
Conference party returned a significant number of delegates who had run 
unopposed.76 While the manner in which the Constituent Assembly was elected is not 
subject to review here, the assembly's actions cannot really be seen as an expression 
of the people's will with respect to the question of the future status of the territory. 
More significantly, the resolution of 5 January 1949 calls for a plebiscite to be 
administered by the UN, and the resolution makes certain other specific provisions to 
ensure that the vote is free and impartial.77 Therefore, an act by the Constituent 
Assembly cannot be a legally sufficient substitute for the plebiscite required by the 
UNCIP resolutions. 
India's claims of changed circumstances made before the Security Council in 
1964 cannot be upheld as a basis for vacating India's obligation to act in accordance 
with UNCIP resolutions. Although both India and Pakistan found it difficult to adhere 
to the provisions of the resolutions, that fact could not terminate the existence of 
obligations stemming from them. United Nations involvement since 1965 has been 
limited to observation of the cease-fire line; the outbreak of war in that year marks the 
end of UN efforts to bring about a mediated settlement. 
Lamb, 192. 
S/1196, 5 January 1949. 
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F. War and Peace: Tashkent and Simla 
In 1965 and again in 1971, India and Pakistan went to war. Neither conflict began in 
Kashmir, but both brought fighting to the state and raised the possibility that the 
Kashmir dispute would be settled on the battlefield. In the event, neither side was able 
to gain much of a territorial advantage in Kashmir: the position of the LOC essentially 
remained unchanged. The two Indo-Pakistani wars were significant, however, because 
they underlined the volatility of the Kashmir dispute, and because bilateral 
negotiations at the end of the 1971 war resulted in an agreement that changed the 
legal complexion of the dispute. 
The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 began as a border dispute over the Rann of 
Kutch, a strange topographical feature at the southern end of the border between India 
and Pakistan. Suitable only for limited grazing during the dry season, the Rann is 
flooded with several feet of salt water during monsoon. Historically the Rann was part 
of the princely state of Kutch, which acceded to India in 1947. India thus claimed the 
entire Rann, which posed no real problems during the dry season, but during monsoon 
India claimed the western shore of the Rann and placed Indian military personnel 
within easy striking distance of Karachi.78 Action in the Rann of Kutch phase of the 
war was well contained, ending with a settlement mediated by Britain which called 
for the dispute over the Rann to be submitted to international arbitration. The conflict 
flared up again in Kashmir later that year as Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, an 
incursion of trained guerrillas supported by the Pakistan Army whose objective was to 
foment rebellion in Indian-held Kashmir. There are two important distinctions to 
make between 1947 and 1965 with respect to the legality of Pakistani actions. First, in 
1947, the Kashmiri civil war was already raging. Second, in 1965 it is clear that the 
7 8 Lamb, 255. 
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incursions were part of official Pakistani policy. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
use offeree by nations may be justified on the grounds of self-defence, whether 
individual or collective. Due to conditions in Kashmir in 1947-8, much of the 
Pakistani action in the first conflict could be explained using the vocabulary of self-
defence. However, the action in 1965 lacks legal justification, as Pakistani guerrillas 
were deployed in the first instance, before any fighting had begun. India responded 
with "defensive" operations designed to close the routes of those guerrillas, and the 
conflict quickly widened into a general war.80 
The international community sought a way to end the war as soon as possible. 
The United States and Britain, the two principal arms suppliers to Pakistan and India 
respectively, instituted embargoes on all materiel. The UN Secretary General 
attempted to negotiate a cease-fire; on 20 September 1965 the Security Council 
passed a resolution demanding a cease-fire within three days. India and Pakistan 
agreed to that cease fire, and then signed a treaty brokered by the Soviet Union at 
Tashkent. The Tashkent accord did not offer a solution to the Kashmir dispute; it 
merely included an item in which India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their forces 
behind the cease-fire line established in 1949. The agreement attempted little more 
with respect to Kashmir than a restoration of the status quo ante and a cessation of 
hostilities. Yet with the primary issues in Kashmir unresolved, the dispute would 
continue to simmer. 
The East Pakistan secession movement of 1970 once again brought the 
Kashmir dispute to the boiling point. India supported East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 
in its successful bid for independence, eventually supporting the rebellion there with 
7 9 Lamb, 258. 
8 0 Action included raids by the Indian Air Force on Pakistan, Pakistani naval bombardment of the 
Indian radar station of Dwarka, and an unsuccessful Indian siege of Lahore. 
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regular ground forces in late 1971. Pakistan retaliated with an invasion of India from 
the west, and the third Indo-Pakistani war was under way.81 As with the second war, 
Pakistan fared poorly but did not suffer any significant territorial losses in Kashmir.82 
Bilateral talks brought the end of the 1971 war, and those negotiations culminated in 
the 1972 Simla Agreement, which provided, inter alia, that India and Pakistan would 
settle all future differences through bilateral negotiations.83 The question thus arises 
whether the Simla Agreement relieved India of its obligation to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir, as that obligation stems from a multilateral agreement. 
Advocates of the Indian case have asserted that the Simla Agreement 
abrogates the terms of the UNCIP resolutions because the Simla Agreement 
establishes a regime for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute that is incompatible 
with the terms of the UNCIP resolutions.84 As the UNCIP resolutions preceded the 
Simla Agreement, the resolutions are thereby invalid. This view finds some support in 
the Vienna Convention, where Articles 30 and 59 restate the principle of customary 
international law that a later treaty takes precedence over an earlier one.85 Supporters 
of Pakistan's case point to a provision in the Simla Agreement in which the two sides 
pledge that the principles and purposes of the UN Charter will govern bilateral 
relations.86 Furthermore, they argue that Article 103 of the UN Charter requires 
member states to give their obligations under the Charter precedence over the terms of 
any other international agreement in the event of a conflict between the two. 
8 1 Lamb, 295. 
8 2 Pakistan lost 280 square miles of territory in Kashmir 
8 3 Simla Agreement, Para I (ii): "That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by 
peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them, [and] neither side shall unilaterally alter the 
situation..." 
8 4 See Hussain, 185-190. 
8 5 Shaw, 650-651. 
8 6 Simla Agreement, I (i). 
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In evaluating the propositions outlined above, the legal mechanisms by which 
the relevant agreements came into force should be addressed first. The UNCIP 
resolutions became operative upon declarations by India and Pakistan of their 
intention to be bound by those resolutions. As the Indian and Pakistani declarations 
were made before the UN, the obligation to carry out the terms of the resolutions 
became a multilateral obligation. Therefore, even i f India and Pakistan's obligations 
to each other changed as a result of their conclusion of the Simla Agreement, their 
obligations to the other member states of the UN to abide by the terms of the UNCIP 
resolutions would remain in force until abrogated by the UN. The Simla Agreement, 
as a bilateral treaty, could only affect obligations owed by India and Pakistan to each 
other. Thus it is submitted that Article 103 does not apply in the present matter 
because India and Pakistan are bound by the UNCIP resolutions through their 
unilateral declarations, not by a specific provision of the Charter. Finally, it may be 
asked whether the Simla Agreement erects a legal barrier to UN involvement in the 
Kashmir dispute by requiring that all subsequent proposals for a solution to the 
dispute emanate from either India or Pakistan. This query must be answered in the 
negative, as Article 103 prevents nations from citing the existence of a bilateral 
accord as justification for avoiding obligations under the UN Charter. One such 
obligation might arise i f the UN should decide that Kashmir is entitled to self-
determination. India and Pakistan's interests in Kashmir partially overlap with respect 
to the issue of self-determination, in that neither state wishes for Kashmir to become 
independent. The UN could demand a settlement in Kashmir through application of 
the principle of self-determination. It is to that principle that our discussion now turns. 
8 7 Hussain, 223, fh. 31. Hussain addresses the issue of whether Simla undermines the power of the UN 
to grant self-determination to Kashmir (190-196). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SELF-DETERMINATION 
Notions of self-determination have figured prominently in the Kashmir dispute since 
the dispute began. The partition of the British Indian Empire reflected the desire of 
Muslims to have a nation separate from Hindu-dominated India; the Indian 
Independence Act ostensibly allowed princely states to choose between accession to 
India or Pakistan and independence; Lord Mountbatten and subsequent Indian leaders 
promised to refer the accession of Kashmir to a popular referendum; and efforts by 
the UN have focussed on creating conditions favourable to a plebiscite with a view 
toward achieving a final resolution of the dispute via the ballot box. The question of 
self-determination in Kashmir has been further complicated by the demographics of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which led Sir Owen Dixon among others to suggest 
that a partition of Kashmir itself may be necessary. Such a suggestion raises the 
fundamental question of what territory is actually in dispute and what choices should 
be given to the people of those areas. 
This chapter will consider the relevance of the principle of self-determination 
to the Kashmir dispute. Self-determination, which began as a rather simple moral 
principle, has evolved into a complex legal one. Accordingly, a discussion of the 
historical evolution of the principle will be necessary to arrive at a functional 
definition of the principle in international law. That discussion will be followed by an 
examination of self-determination as applied in the modern era, which will help to 
elucidate the principle further through examples provided by arbitral awards and state 
practice. Lastly, an attempt will be made to apply the principle to the Kashmir 
dispute, in light of the theoretical and practical framework established in the first part 
of this chapter. 
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A. Self-Determination: The Historical Background 
Scholars trace the principle of self-determination to the late eighteenth century, when 
it was first articulated in the American Revolution and in revolutionary France1. The 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) advanced the notions that government 
must be politically accountable to the people that it governs and that the people may 
create a new government. Thus one of the "revolutionary" principles of American 
government is that the government belongs to the people, a departure from the 
prevailing legal order of the eighteenth century, which held that all people were 
subjects of the head of state. Revolutionary France likewise rejected the ancien 
regime model of sovereignty and asserted that France could annex territory i f the 
inhabitants of that territory should vote to become part of France, and furthermore, 
that any territorial annexations by France should be confirmed by plebiscite. But 
principles of popular sovereignty soon came into conflict with political reality, 
foreshadowing today's conflict between guaranteeing self-determination and 
preserving the territorial integrity of states. France, for example, settled on a policy of 
admitting the result of an annexation plebiscite only when the vote was for union with 
France; it annexed other areas by force. In the United States, the secession of the 
southern states in 1861 necessitated a substantial qualification of the arguments of 
1776. Both the American and French doctrines, however, established that the wishes 
of the people could be of consequence when deterniining sovereignty . 2 
Such concepts of self-determination would arrive on the international scene by 
the end of World War I , especially with respect to Woodrow Wilson's plan for the 
disposition of lands previously possessed by the Central Powers, as well as with the 
1 Antonio Cassesse, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, 11; Geiger, "Self-
Determination," EPIL, 364. 
2 Cassesse, 13. 
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emergence of the Soviet state.3 In the case of the latter, Soviet doctrine championed 
the right of peoples to secede from "imperial" states in order to form socialist 
republics. The Soviet conception of self-determination was designed principally as a 
means of furthering socialism in particular as opposed to popular sovereignty in 
general; however, Soviet insistence on the right of colonised peoples to secede from 
an imperial power formed the basis for the anti-colonialism inherent in the modern 
doctrine of self-determination 4 Wilsonian self-determination, crystallised in Wilson's 
famous Fourteen Points, championed popular sovereignty as the only just basis for 
redrawing the map of Central Europe after World War I , yet application of the 
principle was very limited. Wilson's view of self-determination was reflected in 
certain plebiscites held after World War I , 5 but the principle was not incorporated into 
the League of Nations Charter, nor would its application trump the territorial 
prerogatives of the victorious Allies, with their extensive colonial possessions. Thus 
self-determination remained a selectively applied political principle that had yet to be 
enshrined in law. 
Self-determination as a legal principle was considered for the first time in the 
Aaland Islands case (1920), in which the ethnically Swedish population of the islands 
sought secession from Finland and union with Sweden.6 Sweden argued for an 
application of the principle of self-determination; Finland countered by asserting that 
international law had no jurisdiction in the matter.7 The League of Nations appointed 
a tribunal to investigate the merits of the Swedish claim, and it ultimately decided that 
self-determination was a political principle and not an international legal norm. The 
3 Geiger, 364. 
4 Cassesse, 19. 
5 Plebiscites were held in Upper Silesia, the Saarland, part of East Prussia and Northern Schleswig. 
6 1920 LNOJ Spec. Supp. No. 3. 
7 Halperin et al., Self-Determination in the New World Order, 19-20. 
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tribunal did, however, impose a settlement on Finland in which Finland promised to 
guarantee a degree of autonomy to the islanders. The tribunal pointed out that its 
involvement had been justified and necessitated by the chronic instability of Finland, 
as opposed to the international rights of the islanders to self-government. Yet it cited 
with approval the notion that the rights of ethnic minorities, i f totally abused by a 
sovereign government, may require international protection—a statement that 
approximates modern notions of self-determination.8 
Self-determination emerged as a true legal principle during the drafting of the 
United Nations Charter. Article 1(2) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of 
the UN is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"; in Article 55 the UN 
membership pledges to promote conditions favourable to the principles of "equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples"; Articles 73 and 74 envisage self-
government for all "non-self governing" (trust) territories, and Article 76 states that 
UN trusteeships are to be seen as a step on the road to self-government.9 
Yet the relevant language in the UN Charter appears to be more hortatory than 
mandatory.10 Certain objections were raised to the principle of self-determination 
during the Charter's drafting. For example, a broad application of self-determination 
could be seen as creating an international right of secession, which would undermine 
the state system on which the UN is founded. Moreover, Germany's behaviour during 
World War II demonstrated that intervention on behalf of "oppressed minorities" 
could merely be a legal fig leaf covering naked territorial aggression, as was the case 
8 Cassesse, 30-31. 
9 UN Charter. 
1 0 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 599. Brownlie writes that until recently the 
majority of Western jurists "assumed or asserted that the principle had no legal content, being an ill-
defined concept of policy and morality." 
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with the German "liberation" of Polish and Czech areas with large German-speaking 
populations. Accordingly, the language of Article 2 of the Charter places certain 
limitations on the concept of self-determination as expressed in other areas of the 
Charter. Article 2(1) states that the UN is based on the "principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its members," and Article 2(7) provides that "nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, or require the members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." 
As such there is considerable ambiguity in the Charter on the question of an 
international right to self-determination. For example, Articles 1 and 55 champion 
self-determination and equal rights for "all peoples." But it is doubtful that this 
provision gives all of the world's peoples a legal personality entitled to self-
government, as many of the world's nations are multiethnic arrangements, and the 
basic unit of international law is the sovereign state, not the ethnic group. Therefore it 
cannot be said that all peoples possess prima facie a legal right under the Charter to 
independence. Moreover, the Charter neither defines what constitutes a people nor 
lays down the specific content of the principle of self-determination.11 Self-
determination in the Charter thus appears to be another of the organisation's lofty 
goals, a concept too vague and imprecise to permit legal application. Yet despite the 
questions of scope left unanswered in the Charter, the fact remains that self-
determination had been incorporated into a multilateral treaty to which most of the 
world's nations were signatories (i.e., the Charter). Adoption of the UN Charter thus 
marks a turning point in the development of self-determination from a political theory 
1 1 M.H. Mendelson, '^ elf-Deterrnination in Jammu and Kashmir," IJ1L (1995), 8-9. 
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to an international legal standard. Subsequent clarification of the concept through 
General Assembly resolutions and ICJ decisions has gradually refined that standard to 
create provisions that are binding on states. 
B. Self-Determination: The Legal Background 
With the coming of the Cold War era, three separate views of self-determination 
emerged from the world's major blocs. Third World states emphasised so-called 
external self-determination, that is, the right of nations to be free of domination by a 
foreign power; that right especially applied to cases of the domination of non-white 
nations by colonial powers, or "salt-water" colonialism. Socialist states echoed that 
anti-colonialism but insisted on a measure of "internal" self-determination, which in a 
socialist context meant the freedom of a people to choose a socialist form of 
government. Western nations initially opposed those interpretations of the principle 
but eventually supported both internal and external self-determination, insisting that 
external self-determination be applied to all cases of foreign domination and that 
internal self-determination required a degree of civil and political freedom tantamount 
to democracy.13 
Consensus on certain aspects of self-determination led to important resolutions 
affecting its legal definition. On 14 December 1960, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 1514(XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. An assertion of external self-determination, this resolution 
essentially bans colonisation and calls for the immediate departure of colonial powers 
from areas that they controlled. Paragraph 2 states that "all peoples have the right to 
self-determination," and paragraph 3 indicates that a lack of preparedness on the part 
1 2 Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, 143. 
1 3 Cassesse, 44-46. 
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of the colonised people would not be grounds for delaying independence any further. 
The resolution directed administrative powers to transfer sovereignty to the peoples of 
their non-self-governing territories. Paragraph 6, however, prohibits use of the 
principle of self-determination to bring about the "partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country," thereby ruling out a right of 
secession and reconciling the language of the resolution with Article 2(7) of the 
Charter. Thus although the resolution appears to endorse a universal right to self-
detennination, its specific provisions are tailored to decolonisation.14 
The General Assembly's adoption of the International Covenants on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was a further step in the development of self-
determination. This resolution of 16 December 1966 asserts the right of all peoples to 
self-determination, using the same language as Resolution 1514. But the Covenants, 
which entered into force in 1976, link self-determination with notions of individual 
rights, which expands the UN definition of self-determination to include internal self-
determination. Paragraph 3 implores states to promote the realisation of self-
determination; the Covenants also shed light on the concept of self-determination by 
affirming that its central goal is the free choice by peoples of their political status, 
without internal or external interference.15 
The General Assembly's most authoritative and comprehensive definition of 
self-determination is found in Resolution 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, the 
Friendly Relations Resolution. This resolution reiterates notions of self-determination 
expressed in prior resolutions, namely, the right of all peoples freely to determine 
their political status without external interference, and the duty of member states to 
1 4 Shaw, International Law, 179. 
1 5 Cassesse, 55. 
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promote principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Paragraph 4 
indicates that the important feature of the principle is the right of the people to choose 
their political status, whether that status is independence, integration with an 
independent state or any other political status freely determined by the people. 
Therefore, the resolution stresses that the critical issue is the method by which the 
people decide their political status and not the result of their choice.16 However, 
Resolution 2625, like Resolution 1514, contains a provision indicating that nothing in 
the resolution shall encourage actions that would compromise the territorial integrity 
or political unity of a sovereign state. 
A fundamental question of law emerges upon a review of the General 
Assembly's self-determination resolutions—how to define "all peoples." The 
resolutions indicate that self-determination is something to which all peoples have a 
right, but they do not spell out a manner in which to decide what constitutes a 
"people." Moreover, the resolutions aim to protect the territorial integrity of states, a 
goal that would be compromised by a ubiquitous exercise of the right of self-
determination. According to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the concept of self-determination 
is ostensibly unsound because an entity that lacks a legal identity cannot be the 
possessor of a legal right; clearly the ability of a people to exercise their right to self-
determination depends upon their ability to achieve recognition as a people in law as 
well as fact.1 7 It would seem that any group that attains international recognition as "a 
people" is entitled to self-determination. Therefore, some clarification of what groups 
qualify as "peoples" will be useful. 
Geiger, 366. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The Future of Public International Law," AIDI, (1973), 233. 
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Generally speaking, external self-determination in the post-World War II era 
refers to decolonisation, and internal self-determination to the notion that the people 
in a given state should have the right to choose their own form of government. 
Cassesse identifies three groups of people who are most clearly entitled to self-
determination: entire populations of sovereign and independent states; entire 
populations of non-self-governing territories that have yet to gain independence; and 
finally, populations living under foreign military occupation.18 In each of the above 
cases, the territory inhabited by the people is already defined, and the people are 
defined by the settled limits of the territory they occupy. In the case of minority 
groups within a sovereign state, however, guarantees that the territorial integrity of 
states will be preserved seem to preclude the international right of a minority group to 
secede.19 The right of minority groups to express themselves politically is 
contemplated as part of internal self-determination. Secession may be permitted in 
cases of so-called carence de souverainete (bankruptcy of sovereignty) in which a 
state either lacks the ability to govern its territory effectively or perpetrates gross 
human rights abuses in a particular section of its territory, yet this exception would 
probably apply only in the rarest and most extreme cases.20 
The attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria in 1967 provides a good 
example of just how far a state can go in its repression of a minority group seeking 
independence. In 1966, mobs killed tens of thousands of Ibo people after an Ibo coup 
against the Nigerian federal government, which had been dominated by the Muslim 
Hausa and Fulani peoples. Military officers of the latter groups staged a counter coup 
and retook control of Nigeria, causing nearly one million Ibo refuges to flee to their 
1 8 Cassesse, 59. 
1 9 Emerson, ''Self-Determination," AJIL (1971), 464. 
2 0 Mendelson, 13. 
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homeland in southeast Nigeria. The new federal military government then tripled the 
number of administrative divisions in the country in an effort to dilute Ibo power. In 
response, southeastern Nigeria declared itself the independent state of Biafra. By the 
time of Biafran secession on 30 May 1967, it is estimated that nearly 30,000 Ibos had 
been massacred; with secession and the ensuing civil war, the number of dead 
approached one million. Biafra attempted to gain international recognition of its 
independence, citing blatant oppression of the Ibo people in its claim to self-
determination. However, only a handful of governments recognised the secessionist 
state,21 and the UN, far from championing Biafran self-determination, indicated its 
unwavering support for Nigerian territorial integrity. Without outside assistance, 
secessionist Biafra was handily reduced by Nigerian federal forces and reincorporated 
within the Nigerian federal state by 1970.22 
The one case in which the principle of carence de soiiverainete seems to apply 
is that of the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971.23 East Pakistan, 
ethnically and culturally distinct from West Pakistan and separated by over 1,000 
miles, began to agitate for independence because of its second-class status within the 
Pakistani state. In response, Pakistan state forces in the area began a brutal campaign 
of repression involving mass killings. The Bangladesh rebels, attracting support from 
India as the conflict merged with the general Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, obtained 
international recognition of their independence, although the UN was careful to couch 
its support for Bangladesh in terms of supporting a fledgling nation rather than 
endorsing secession.24 
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia 




The cases of the secessions of Biafra and Bangladesh may be distinguished in 
two ways: first, Bangladesh, in a addition to being ethnically distinct from West 
Pakistan, was also geographically separate; and second, India ensured the success of 
the secession movement by intervening in the conflict and defeating Pakistan in the 
1971 war. Thus Bangladesh succeeded where Biafra did not—largely because 
Pakistan was not able to hold Bangladesh by force. As the AalandIslands case had 
foreshadowed, the right of a minority group to self-determination in the modern era 
probably depends most on the strength and stability of the regime from which that 
group would secede. Writers agree that as a general rule, the principle of self-
determination does not comprise right to secede. 
With the scope of the doctrine outlined, the extent to which self-determination 
is binding as an international legal norm should also be addressed. Immediately after 
the promulgation of the three UN resolutions mentioned above, there was some 
question as to whether the General Assembly was competent to create new principles 
of international law. 2 5 However, that debate was resolved by two ICJ decisions in the 
1970s in which the principle of self-determination, as expounded in the UN 
resolutions, was incorporated into customary international law.2 6 
In the case of the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ considered the right of 
the Namibians to self-determination upon the extinction of the mandate under which 
they had previously been governed. The Court noted that the development of the law 
of non-self-governing territories, especially Resolution 1514, had made the principle 
of self-determination applicable to all such territories. Stating that self-determination 
clearly embraced territories under a colonial regime, the ICJ related Resolution 1514 
2 5 Emerson, 460. 
.2 6Shaw, 180. 
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to the case at hand by holding that the resolution applies to all peoples and territories 
which have not yet attained independence27 
Four years later in the Western Sahara advisory opinion, the ICJ restated its 
incorporation of self-determination resolutions into customary law; the Court also 
expanded somewhat on its statements in the Namibia case by citing with approval 
Resolution 2625 as well. The case arose from the decision on the part of the Spanish 
government to embark on a liberalisation programme, which included decolonisation 
of all Spanish overseas territories, including the province of Western Sahara on the 
Atlantic Coast of Africa between Morocco and Mauritania. Spain contended that the 
future of the province would have to be decided through an internationally supervised 
plebiscite, while Morocco and Mauritania each presented historic claims to the 
Western Sahara.28 The ICJ stated that principles of self-deterniination as expressed in 
Resolutions 1514 and 2625 required that the freely expressed wishes of the people be 
taken into account when determining the future of a colonial territory. 
Finally, in the case of East Timor {Portugal v. Australia), the ICJ once again 
asserted the place of self-determination in international law.2 9 The case arose from an 
oil-drilling concession obtained by Australia from Indonesia off the coast of East 
Timor. In 1975 Indonesia invaded Portuguese East Timor and claimed the territory 
(and after 1982, a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone);30 however many within East 
Timor pushed for independence, asserting the right to self-determination in 
accordance with principles of decolonisation. Indonesia violently crushed an incipient 
East Timorese independence movement in 1991, prompting Portugal to question the 
validity of Indonesia's presence in East Timor, and consequently, Australia's lease. 
2 7 1971 ICJ Reports, 16. 
2 8 1975 ICJ Reports, 12. 
2 9 1995 ICJ Reports, 90. 
3 0 The 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea provides for a 200-mile EEZ. 
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The Court's opinion in the case was substantially insignificant, because it sidestepped 
the central question of sovereignty over East Timor: Noting Indonesia's refusal to 
participate in the proceedings, the Court stated that it could not make a determination 
on the sovereignty question without Indonesia present. In a formal sense, however, 
the Court's opinion was an important reaffirmation of the status of self-determination 
as an international legal norm.31 
The ICJ opinions above did not fundamentally alter the principle of self-
determination as expressed in the UN resolutions, but they established the binding 
nature of self-determination in international law. Therefore, in light of the 
development of the principle since the founding of the UN, it is possible to identify 
three types of cases in which self-determination is applicable. First, self-determination 
includes the right of existing states to choose freely their own political system and to 
pursue their own economic, social and cultural development. That is not to say that 
states have a duty to guarantee democracy to their citizens; rather, the state should be 
free from outside interference in accordance with principles of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention. Self-determination also applies to situations where the existence and 
extent of territorial sovereignty are unclear, or where the government is powerless or 
unwilling to protect a specific minority group from abuses of its most basic human 
rights. However, any group must have a clearly defined territorial base in order to 
apply the principle of carence de souveraineie. Finally, self-determination applies in 
cases of decolonisation, as set out in the Namibia and Western Sahara opinions. The 
latter, which incorporates Resolution 2625, recognised that any non-self-governing 
territory has a legal status which is distinct from the entity administering it. 
3 1 Shaw, 180 
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C. Application of the Principle 
A review of state practice with respect to self-determination allows for a more 
concrete appraisal of the manner in which self-determination is applied. Each claim of 
self-determination is of course unique, but one may generalise to some extent about 
the elements of those which have been successful. Indeed it is also possible to 
distinguish between different types of self-determination claims: for example, 
Halperin and Scheffer identify six such categories.32 For the purposes of clarifying the 
applicability of the principle, however, it will suffice to make a few general 
observations about the doctrine with reference to recent, specific cases. 
First, a "people" have a definite advantage in international law when their 
territory is already defined. Such a situation allows for a simple determination of 
exactly which people will have recourse to self-deterrnination, and it also does not 
require the redrawing of international borders. For example, in cases of 
decolonisation, the principle of uti possidetis was applied to transfer territorial 
sovereignty from the colonial power to the new, native government. On the other 
hand, peoples whose "territory" spans several states must necessarily disrupt the 
territorial integrity of those states i f their claims are to be successful, and it is clear 
from the relevant UN resolutions and Charter provisions that an exercise of self-
determination would not be permitted in those cases; such an action would 
compromise principles of sovereign equality and the state system. Consequently, the 
Kurds, who inhabit lands stretching across Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Iran, and the 
Basques, whose territory straddles the border between France and Spain, will 
probably not achieve political independence even though they are "peoples."33 
3 2 Halperin et al., 46-52. Their six categories of self-determination are: anti-colonial, sub-state, trans-
state, dispersed peoples, indigenous, and representative. 
3 3 Halperin et al , 50. 
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A well-defined territory, however, is no guarantee that self-determination will 
obtain. As we have seen, there is no international right to secession. As with trans-
state populations, peoples located within a well-defined area of a sovereign state face 
the substantial qualification that self-determination must not upset a state's territorial 
integrity. Many states have emerged through secession, but those secessions, when 
accomplished peacefully, have generally taken place during a period of marked 
instability within the territory of the former sovereign. For example, the Baltic 
republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia seceded from the Soviet Union in 1990. 
Within one year, all three had achieved international recognition of independence, 
largely because of the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union itself.34 Similarly, 
Slovakia split away from the Czech Republic after the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe. Claims by peoples to separate status can often be resolved in a manner that 
quells the desire for secession—for example, Quebec and Scotland have attained 
privileged, semi-autonomous positions within Canada and the United Kingdom 
respectively35—but most groups seeking independence generally find little more than 
moral support for their positions in the doctrine of self-determination. 
The inability of secessionist groups to achieve their goals through an 
application of self-determination represents a clear limit to the doctrine. Indeed self-
determination, i f carried to its utmost logical extent, could easily result in the total 
disintegration of the state system as smaller and smaller groups successfully claimed 
independence.36 Thus it stands to reason that the community of states would resist 
efforts to apply self-determination in a manner inconsistent with its own survival. 
This position was plainly articulated by UN Secretary-General U Thant during the 
3 4 Halperin et al., 28. 
3 5 The Scottish Parliament reopened in 1997 after almost 300 years of dormancy; the other Canadian 
provinces have accorded the French language a special status in an effort to keep Quebec in Canada. 
3 6 Emerson, 470. 
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civil war that followed the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria in early 1967. 
Referring to the UN's successful efforts to prevent the secession of Katanga from the 
Congo a few years earlier, Thant stated that as "an international organization, the 
United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will ever 
accept the principle of secession of a part" of a member state.37 
Yet decolonisation presents an apparent exception to the rule against the 
disruption of territorial integrity. If colonies could leave empires because they wished 
to, why could portions of states not leave states, especially i f the areas seeking 
independence had a "colonial" relationship with the central government? That rather 
glaring contradiction has been resolved in two ways: first, through the decolonisation 
resolution (1514(XV)), which categorically abolishes colonialism in international law, 
and second, through the theory of continuing aggression.38 The latter, expounded by 
India during its forced removal of the Portuguese from Goa in 1960, holds that 
decolonisation is not secession at all; rather, it is the restoration of the legitimate, 
native sovereignty of which the people had been illegitimately deprived by the 
colonial power. International acceptance of India's arguments underscores the notion 
that self-determination was primarily intended to abolish European overseas empires, 
or salt-water colonialism.39 Subsequent state practice outside the colonial context has 
affirmed that self-determination also applies in cases where state disintegration was 
already in progress, as with the Soviet Union or Federal Yugoslavia. Indeed 
decolonisation mirrors the Soviet and Balkan cases in that it occurred at a time when 
the influence of European powers in Africa and Asia was on the wane; post-World 
War II Europe lacked the financial might to maintain vast empires, and self-
3 7 Emerson, 464. 
3 8 Emerson, 465. 
3 9 Shaw, 796. 
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determination provided the moral and legal framework for the "return" of African and 
Asian countries to native sovereignty, something that was made practically inevitable 
by the general diminution of European power worldwide 4 0 
How, then, does the principle of self-determination apply to groups seeking 
independence from a well-established state? One answer is provided by the case of 
Eritrea, which gained its independence in 1992 by defeating former overlord Ethiopia 
in a thirty-year war that claimed half a million lives. Eritrea asserted its right to self-
determination the old-fashioned way, yet international law is supposed to provide a 
more peaceful means for dispute resolution. In theory, it is the province of the UN to 
counteract infringements of the right to self-determination, and the UN has acted in 
such a manner in a few cases: in apartheid South Africa, in Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), and in northern Iraq.41 However, because of the political and military 
factors involved in enforcing self-determination, the UN has often moved very 
cautiously in determining that a violation has occurred in the first place. The perpetual 
slipperiness of such key concepts as "peoples" or "alien subjugation" ensures that any 
debate in the UN on the merits of a self-determination claim will be highly politicised, 
as was the case with the Falkland Islands dispute in 1982 4 2 Yet the question of 
whether a self-determination claim has legal merit may still be evaluated according to 
established principles of international law, and it is to this task that we now turn with 
respect to the case of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Of course most African and Asian international boundaries reflect administrative boundaries drawn 
during colonial rule. See Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries, 
4 1 Cassesse, 158. 
4 2 Lowell Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, Chapter 3: "Self-
Determination." 
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D. Application of the Principle: Jammu and Kashmir 
The central question that one encounters in applying the principle of self-
determination to the Kashmir dispute is whether there exists a population on which an 
exercise of popular sovereignty could be based. Attempts to achieve a final territorial 
disposition in Kashmir have usually recommended that some barometer of the 
people's will be consulted. All of those attempts, however, have failed for lack of a 
mutually agreed procedure for consulting the people. Negotiations have broken down 
over the questions of what territory would be subject to the plebiscite and which 
people would participate in the vote, those questions of course being outgrowths of 
the underlying territorial dispute. Thus in order to evaluate the question of self-
determination in Kashmir, it will be necessary to consider both territory and 
population as bases for an exercise of the right.43 
Territory 
The territory of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is now 
divided among three countries. Cases in which self-determination has been applied to 
a particular territory have involved territories with settled and defined boundaries. 
Although self-determination purports to be a right that is exercised by peoples, those 
peoples are often defined by the limits of the territory that they inhabit. Self-
determination in cases of decolonisation (Western Sahara) or Article 73 non-self-
governing territories (Namibia) proceeded according to the territorial limits of those 
areas. Self-determination, as a principle of international law, has contemplated 
secession only in "colonial" situations, and resolutions clarifying the principle have 
stressed that an exercise of self-determination must not disrupt the territorial integrity 
of an established state. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was not a non-self-
4 3 Robert McCorquodale, '^ elf-Determination: A Human Rights Approach," ICLQ (1994), 866-870. 
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governing territory under Article 73, and although it was under the "alien 
subjugation" of Britain until 1947, the British relinquished sovereignty to the 
Maharaja, whose forbears had been the legitimate rulers of the area prior to accepting 
the suzerainty of the Crown in 1846. After 15 August 1947, the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir was legally independent, although circumstances in the region subsequently 
brought about its disintegration in the period 1947-62. 
The first question that arises in connection with self-determination for 
Kashmir is whether the people of Jammu and Kashmir had an international right to be 
consulted prior to the Maharaja's accession to India; i f so, then the current territorial 
regime would be illegal until confirmed by plebiscite. It is clear, however, that 
international law in 1947 did not prohibit the princely form of government, nor did it 
require that the accession of the princely states to India or Pakistan be ratified by 
plebiscite.44 Moreover, as set out above, self-determination in 1947 retained much of 
its purely moral character and had not yet matured into an international legal norm. 
Thus even i f the modern principle of self-determination required a plebiscite in order 
to confirm a territorial change like the one occasioned by the Maharaja's accession to 
India, the principle of inter-temporal law requires that that accession be evaluated 
accorded to standards prevailing in 1947 4 5 
The binding force of Lord Mountbatten's promise that the Maharaja's 
accession would be confirmed by plebiscite has been assessed above.46 For the 
purposes of self-determination analysis, it should be noted that such a vote is not 
feasible now that the State of Jammu and Kashmir no longer exists 4 7 Even i f the 
population of the former princely state had been entitled to self-determination at one 
4 4 Mendelson, 22. 
45 Isle ofPalmas Case, 2 RIAA 829. 
4 6 See Chapters 1 and 3. 
4 7 Mendelson, 22. 
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time, that state is now defunct and its boundaries have been fundamentally altered. 
Proposals for a plebiscite must instead consider smaller territorial units defined by the 
presence of ethnically distinct groups of inhabitants. 
Population 
The legal right of self-determination properly resides with those peoples who 
are entitled to exercise i t . 4 8 In the case of Kashmir, it is difficult to identify such a 
singular people. One method would be to consider all those people residing within the 
territorial limits of the former princely state to be the people of Kashmir; however, to 
pursue such an approach would contradict the rule that an exercise of self-
determination cannot disrupt a state's territorial integrity. I f that objection is 
neglected for the sake of argument, there remains a great deal of ethnic and religious 
diversity within those lands that had been ruled by the Maharaja. Accordingly, some 
smaller group must be selected in order for there to be "a people" entitled to exercise 
self-determination. This is the quandary that led to Sir Owen Dixon's proposal for 
regional plebiscites based on demographic divisions within the boundaries of the 
former princely state. Yet Sir Owen's proposals were designed as a means of 
resolving the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir: never was it 
submitted that any of the peoples who might have participated in such plebiscites 
possessed a right in international law to determine their territorial status. An appraisal 
of the regions comprised by the former State of Jammu and Kashmir leads to the 
conclusion that the only people who would likely wish to alter their territorial status 
are the predominantly Muslim residents of the Vale of Kashmir.49 However, both 
accession to Pakistan and complete independence would require the Vale's secession 
4 8 Robert McCorquodale, ''Self Determination: A Human Rights Approach," 868, fh. 59. 
4 9 Gururaj Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem, 113. Jammu and Ladakh, whose populations 
are predominantly Hindu and Buddhist respectively, would prefer to remain in India; Azad Kashmir 
and the Northern Areas are pro-Pakistan 
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from India, something not contemplated by modern notions of self-determination as 
articulated in UN resolutions and state practice. We will now address whether 
secession may be permitted on the grounds that India has abused its sovereignty 
through oppression of the Muslim residents of the Vale. 
Carence de Souverainete (Bankruptcy of Sovereignty) 
As stated above, only in the most extreme cases of oppression would a 
minority group acquire a right to secede from an independent state. State practice and 
international legal norms generally abhor secession, and even the abuses of the 
Nigerian federal government in the late 1960s were not sufficient to provoke 
international recognition of Biafra. Oppressed minorities have successfully gained 
international rights only in cases where the central government was weak or coming 
apart; brutality alone has not been sufficient to trigger a right to self-determination. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the cases of Biafra and Bangladesh, the world 
community is more prepared to countenance secession when it is instigated by 
peoples living in a geographically distinct area. Recognition of the rights of such 
peoples does not present such an obvious conflict with the rule that self-determination 
must not disrupt the territorial integrity of states. 
It is clear that the Indian government has perpetrated gross abuses in Kashmir. 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the National Human Rights 
Commission (of India) have produced many reports documenting the routine use of 
extrajudicial execution, rape and torture by Indian security forces in Kashmir since 
the late 1980s.50 The reports suggest that those practices are part of an official policy 
of repression, as few of the perpetrators have ever faced prosecution despite the fact 
that India's municipal law prohibits such conduct. 
5 0 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 84. 
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Yet Kashmir is geographically contiguous with India; it has been incorporated 
within the Indian union under Article 370 of the Indian constitution; and even the 
Vale of Kashmir has been home to a large Hindu population, which fled en masse in 
1990 in response to campaigns of violence directed against them by Muslim 
insurgents.51 An even greater obstacle to Kashmiri self-determination may be found in 
the disparate goals of those protesting Indian rule. Some groups favour union with 
Pakistan while others advocate complete independence.52 Thus while Indian rule has 
been demonstrably oppressive, its opponents are divided on the question of what new 
territorial situation ought to succeed the present one. Moreover, Kashmiri 
secessionists do not have a clear territorial base from which to operate, nor does it 
appear that Kashmiri territory is geographically separate to the extent that 
secessionists could successfully claim that Kashmir is an internal colony. 
One point when a "bankruptcy of sovereignty" might have been observed is 
during the accession crisis in 1947, with the Poonch rebellion and the collapse of the 
Maharaja's regime. In that case the Maharaja's subjects had nearly rebelled 
successfully against oppressive rule. However, as the legality of that accession may 
itself be called into question, it is more appropriate to consider the events accession 
crisis separately, as has been done here. In sum, because of Kashmir's contiguity with 
India and the extreme nature of the oppression required by the bankruptcy of 
sovereignty doctrine, as well as the lack of applicable precedents, one can conclude 
that international law would not permit the secession of all or part of Kashmir from 
India on the grounds that India has abused its sovereignty there. 
5 1 ibid. 
52Some of these movements (and their goals) are. the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(independence); Jamaat-e-Islami (union with Pakistan); Harakat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (pan-Islamic 
liberation). 
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E. Conclusion—Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity 
The principle of self-determination has, from its inception, represented a challenge to 
established government. Self-determination means that all peoples and all non-self-
governing territories can freely determine their territorial status. In theory, self-
determination may be exercised by all peoples, but the international community has 
consistently refused to recognise applications of self-determination that would 
compromise the territorial integrity of an established state. The contradiction between 
allowing for self-determination and preserving territorial integrity has been resolved 
by using self-determination as the legal framework for determining a new territorial 
order in cases where change is inevitable. 
Thus, self-determination was used to manage decolonisation, which became 
necessary when the European powers were no longer financially capable of 
maintaining their overseas empires; self-determination has also been the mechanism 
by which trust territories have gained independence; and self-determination guided 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism in Europe. Self-
determination can also be seen as creating a general requirement that popular will 
should be consulted before any territorial change is made. Yet self-determination does 
not appear to have been intended to bring about territorial changes in the first 
instance. On the contrary, the relevant UN resolutions, ICJ opinions and instances of 
state practice point unanimously to a desire to preclude secessionist groups or landless 
peoples from availing themselves of the doctrine and threatening the stability of the 
state system. Consequently, although a plebiscite has consistently been seen as the 
only way to resolve the Kashmir dispute, it cannot be maintained that the Kashmiri 
people have an international right to secession or independence. 
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CONCLUSION 
A commonly held belief about the Kashmir dispute is that Pakistan seeks the 
involvement of the world community while India considers the matter to be strictly 
internal. Although that belief finds substantial justification in the policies of the two 
nations, it would be incorrect to infer that an analysis of the Kashmir dispute in 
international law would necessarily favour Pakistan. I f at some point India and 
Pakistan decide to submit the dispute to an international tribunal for arbitration 
according to principles of international law, both sides will be able to present 
persuasive arguments. 
This paper has addressed the most salient legal points in the dispute. India and 
Pakistan might bolster their legal dossiers with additional points in the event of 
international arbitration, but the issues of accession, the use of force, diplomacy, and 
self-determination would be paramount in those proceedings. To conclude this 
analysis of the Kashmir dispute, it will be appropriate to review those issues and 
reflect upon the relative strength of the claims of India and Pakistan to Kashmir. 
India's claim rests on the accession of the Maharaja to India on 27 October 
1947. Hundreds of other princely states acceded to India without incident—the prince 
signed a document in which he gave India the power conduct defence, foreign affairs 
and communications in the state. Integration within the Indian Union as a Part (B) 
state would follow. At no time were the princes required to consult their people before 
acceding. They had a moral obligation to act in the best interests of their people, but 
that is all. Generally speaking the instrument of accession was simply a rubber stamp 
giving India or Pakistan sovereignty over the princely states, which had some degree 
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of autonomy within the British Empire and which became technically independent 
with British departure. 
However, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was anything but a mere 
formality. Both India and Pakistan hoped for the Maharaja's accession, while the 
Maharaja himself sought to avoid it. The complexity surrounding accession indicates 
that on the eve of Indian independence, there was an incipient dispute between India 
and Pakistan over who would get Kashmir. That disagreement prevented accession 
from being accomplished in a straightforward manner, which in turn set the stage for 
today's sovereignty dispute. In an attempt to unravel the issue of accession, the 
following observations can be made. 
First, there is little doubt that the Maharaja actually signed the instrument of 
accession, and that there was no coercion or fraud on the part of India in that respect. 
Perhaps the Maharaja dreamed of being ruler of the "Switzerland of the East," but he 
could not control his own territory with the forces available to him, and he acceded to 
India to gain military assistance and save his government. Accession to Pakistan 
would have brought the Maharaja's rule to an abrupt end. That of course was the goal 
of the rebels who had forced his hand. The Maharaja's days were numbered in any 
case—he was eventually deposed by the Indian government in 1949.1 
The strongest argument against the validity of accession is that the Maharaja 
lacked the legal capacity to accede. Kashmir was in full-scale rebellion. The Maharaja 
was forced to flee Srinagar for his own safety, the Jammu and Kashmir state forces 
had essentially been defeated on the battlefield, and the Maharaja had to seek outside 
assistance to maintain his position as ruler. Tribunals have held that in such 
1 In June 1949 the Indian government persuaded the Maharaja to take an extended holiday outside 
Kashmir and then advised him never to return to Kashmir. He died in Bombay in 1962 without having 
returned. 
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circumstances a government may cease to have a legal personality. It was probably 
for that reason that Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, recommended 
that a "reference to the people" decide the question of accession. It was unlikely that a 
vote based on the extant electoral rolls in Kashmir in 1947 would have gone against 
India, or that India would have recommended such a vote otherwise. More probably, 
Mountbatten and other Indian leaders recognised that the Maharaja's legal capacity to 
accede was shaky, and that Kaslimir's accession to the Indian Union should be 
confirmed by a vote in order to put the accession of Kashmir beyond question.2 Calls 
by India for a plebiscite in the period just after accession should therefore be seen as 
an attempt to solidify title to Kashmir, something that India felt had not been 
accomplished by the instrument of accession in the circumstances under which it was 
signed. In the case of another controversial accession—Junagadh—India held a lop-
sided plebiscite after occupying the predominantly Hindu state, whose Muslim ruler 
had acceded to Pakistan. In that way the plebiscite, however fair or accurate, 
conferred some legitimacy on India's territorial ambitions. 
Pakistan, too, had territorial ambitions, especially in Kaslunir, which 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah believed would fall into Pakistan "like a ripe fruit." Pakistan 
must have quickly realised that a more proactive approach would be necessary to 
secure the mountainous princely state. It cannot be demonstrated that Pakistan 
attempted to coerce the Maharaja by instituting a blockade of Kashmir, nor is there 
any proof of official involvement by Pakistan in supporting the Poonch rebels. Yet 
while supplies became scarce in Srinagar, weapons and ammunition were finding 
their way into Kashmir from Pakistan. More importantly, the Pathan tribesmen used 
2 Mountbatten may have personally believed that a plebiscite was the right thing to do. During a 
meeting with the Maharaja in late June 1947, he suggested that the Maharaja should "consult the will of 
the people" before acceding to India or Pakistan 
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Pakistan as a base of operations for attacks against the Maharaja in Kashmir. The 
international legal norms regarding the use of force prohibit states from tolerating the 
presence of armed bands or other irregular forces plotting incursions into a 
neighbouring state, especially when those forces are fighting on the host state's 
behalf. Thus it appears from the record that Pakistan's attempt in 1947 to fight for 
Kashmir by proxy represents an illegal use of force; the ill-starred Operation Gibraltar 
venture in 1965 being a more egregious example still.3 
The territorial implications of that finding, however, are less clear. When the 
dust from the first Indo-Pakistani war began to settle in 1949, there were two major 
areas of the former princely state that India did not control despite the Maharaja's 
accession and the intervention of the formidable Indian Army. These were the 
Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, both of which saw popular revolts against the 
Maharaja in autumn 1947. Pakistan's illegal support of the armed bands very nearly 
brought down the Maharaja's government, but in the end Pakistan was left defending 
only the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir. Although charges of illegality may be 
substantiated against Pakistan for its behaviour in October 1947, the subsequent 
occupation of both areas by Pakistan troops may be justified on the grounds that 
neither area had ever been effectively possessed by India after accession. Because 
India was unable to occupy those areas, India never gained sovereignty over them, 
and Pakistan's presence there cannot be considered aggression. 
India's referral of the dispute to the United Nations in 1948, while very much 
in the spirit of the UN Charter, represents somewhat of a tactical failure on India's 
part. Complaining of Pakistani "aggression" in Azad Kashmir and the Northern 
3 India alleges that Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, continues to train and fund terrorist groups 
in Kashmir. 
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Areas, India requested that the Security Council order Pakistan to depart those areas. 
Instead, the UN became fixated on the concept of a plebiscite to determine territorial 
sovereignty, generating resolutions in which India and Pakistan pledged to resolve the 
dispute by referring it to the Kashmiri people. Thus the involvement of the UN 
transformed the plebiscite issue from a domestic Indian matter into an international 
one—precisely the sort of internationalisation that India has tried to avoid ever since. 
UN involvement also appeared to recognise the legitimacy of the Azad government 
and Pakistan's control of the Northern Areas. Although the UN's plebiscite requests 
were never heeded, UN involvement in the Kashmir dispute has firmly established the 
principle that a plebiscite should be used to resolve any outstanding territorial 
disagreements in Kashmir. India's pledges to take a vote in Kashmir, which began as 
a moral obligation to the Kashmiri people, became a legal obligation to the world 
once they were made in an international forum. It is submitted that India's efforts to 
extricate itself have not been successful from a legal point of view. Neither the 
ratification of the Indian Constitution by the Kashmir Assembly, nor the 1972 Simla 
Agreement, nor India's claims of changed circumstances have released India from this 
obligation. 
As stated previously, not all of the lands of the former princely state of Jammu 
and Kashmir are truely in controversy. The current LOC represents a rough de facto 
international boundary, and plebiscites would probably be superfluous in Jammu, 
Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. It is only in the Vale of Kashmir that 
the LOC fails to offer a territorial division acceptable to both sides. It is clear today, 
as it was to UN officials at the beginning of the dispute, that Kashmir will itself have 
to be partitioned in some manner, with the Indo-Pakistani frontier snaking north-south 
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through the western portion of the former princely state. It is in drawing a permanent, 
undefended line that plebiscite results could be most useful. 
Indeed the international legal norm of self-determination would appear to 
require that the people of the Vale of Kashmir be consulted before a border is 
finalised by UN action, and especially i f territorial changes are made. Claims that 
Kashmiris may invoke self-determination to secede from India cannot be 
substantiated. However, the principle of self-determination has definitely applied in 
cases where a territorial change is necessary. Hopefully India and Pakistan will decide 
to settle the Kashmir dispute, which is probably not as intractable than the nations' 
official positions would suggest. UN-supervised plebiscites could be held in the Vale 
of Kashmir and in any other contested areas adjacent to the LOC to determine the 
final shape of the border. Once that border has been agreed, India and Pakistan can 
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